Battle Analysis
The War Where Moving Became the Most Dangerous Act: The Russo-Ukrainian War's "Movement-Cost Regime"
· 2023-06 – 2026-03 · Kriegsspiel by Honey Badger
Overview (BLUF)
Most commentary on the Russo-Ukrainian war counts drones: how many, of what type. A field report by Britain's RUSI, based on visits to Ukrainian brigades in November 2024 and January 2025 and published in February 2025, contains a different number. Ukrainian brigades reported that about 50% of their losses occur not in forward positions but while moving in the rear (brigade self-reporting, claimed). The most expensive moment is when people step into the open to rotate, resupply or recover equipment.
This column makes a single argument. Because drone observation now extends about 15 km behind the contact line, rotation, resupply and casualty evacuation are no longer separate administrative tasks. They draw on one shared movement budget. Rotations have become rare, two- and three-person groups hold positions for weeks, and on a thinned line the moment of relief and the boundary between units have become the main targets of small enemy infiltrations. Night, fog, rain and the leaves on the tree lines act as windows that lower the cost of movement, and both sides compete for them.
This is not a battle study. It is an intelligence analysis of a battlefield-wide pattern, using open sources published between June 2023 and March 2026. Many of the key figures rest on one research institute's fieldwork and on Ukrainian testimony, so what is confirmed and what is claimed are kept separate throughout.
Background: Where Does the "Rear" Begin?
The starting point is distance. According to RUSI, layered drone networks create effective "battlefield transparency" within 3 km of the contact line; observation continues, at lower density, to a depth of 15 km; and drones can be tasked with usable precision out to 40 km. Fibre-optic FPV range is given as about 10 km, and digging plant rarely comes closer than 7 km, so forward positions are dug by hand (source 1, Figure 1).
The dispositions in the same report fit these depths. One brigade held a 27 km frontage with four battalions; companies were spread over about 3 km of depth and battalions over about 7 km. The space doctrine calls "the rear", where company assembly areas and battalion supply points used to sit, is now inside the observation and strike envelope.
Later press reports put the depth of the danger zone at 20 km (AFP, February 2026) or 25 km (citing Forbes, May 2025) (sources 5, 6). These figures use different definitions and should not be read as a time series. They all point the same way, though: the first few kilometres behind the line are no longer safe.
Figure 1. Depth bands behind the contact line (log scale). Solid bands are RUSI fieldwork values; the hatched band is from secondary reports with differing definitions. Schematic only; not unit positions and not the current situation — Own work, based on sources 1, 5, 6
The Movement-Cost Regime: Rotation, Resupply and Evacuation Share One Bottleneck
Inside this depth, three tasks pass through the same bottleneck.
- Rotation: RUSI traced rear-area losses to people crossing open ground during rotation, resupply and equipment recovery. Ukraine's "first tactical adaptation" was to rotate less. Troops stayed in position for more than a month, and commanders judged that the risk of rotation outweighed the benefit of rest (source 1). In December 2025 a report described two soldiers who stayed 165 days in a single position on the Zaporizhzhia axis because drones watched every approach; the same article said rotations were rare across the front (source 2, individual testimony).
- Evacuation: Medics cannot be stationed in positions. RUSI found that evacuation has to be a planned operation, timed for fog, heavy rain or darkness and supported by artillery and smoke, and that the interval from wounding to evacuation runs from hours to days. Comrades who rushed out to help the wounded tended to take further losses. The report concluded that existing NATO medical doctrine is impractical under current combat conditions (source 1).
- Resupply: Drones carry ammunition, rations and sometimes hot food. Their payload limits, however, put a ceiling on the troop density that can be sustained in a position (source 1).
Put together, the three form one chain. Only as many people can be placed as can be supplied; those placed cannot easily be relieved; and those wounded cannot be brought back at once. Seen separately they look like logistics, personnel and medical problems, but under the same surveillance network they spend one movement budget. That structure is what this column calls the movement-cost regime.
The Moment of Relief Becomes the Breach Point
When the movement budget shrinks, the line thins. At the time of the RUSI fieldwork, Ukrainian section frontages were 70–200 m and firing positions about 50 m apart were held by groups of two or three (source 1, confirmed). In October 2025 Ukrainian media, citing soldiers, reported gaps between neighbouring positions of typically 200–300 m, in places 500–700 m and up to 1 km, with some positions said to exist "mainly on paper" (sources 3, 4). Actual manning is classified, so these figures are claims without official confirmation (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Spacing between positions. Solid bars are confirmed RUSI fieldwork values (Nov 2024–Jan 2025); dashed bars are claimed values from soldier accounts (Oct 2025). The two sources measure different things, so direct comparison is limited — Own work, based on sources 1, 3, 4
A thin line combined with rare rotation turns relief itself into a dangerous moment. RUSI notes that reliefs are planned operations carried out at night or in bad weather, and that these are the same conditions Russian forces prefer for assaults. Poorly managed reliefs let Russian troops into positions and led to neighbouring units' flanks being turned (source 1). The attacker has adapted to the same picture: according to the report, Russian assaults rarely exceed section size, with sections of about eight drawing fire to reveal positions or probing the boundaries between units.
There is a second-order effect. A unit that is rotated out does not benefit from the positions it dug, which weakens the incentive to improve them. RUSI notes that Russia fixes divisions and armies to particular axes so commanders learn the ground, and that Ukraine's shift to a corps structure partly targets the same problem (source 1). On this battlefield, breakthroughs are more likely at the seam between two units and at the moment people change over than at a front where fire is concentrated.
Night, Fog and Leaves: Seasonal Windows for Movement
When movement is expensive, the conditions that make it cheaper, the hours and seasons that blind observation, become scarce. As shown above, rotation, evacuation and enemy assaults all seek night, fog and rain. Night is not safe either: RUSI notes that slow bomber drones, which must hover, are used mainly after dark (source 1). The window is not a fixed timetable but each day's observation conditions.
A seasonal axis sits on top of this (Figure 3).
- Tree lines and leaves: The open plains of southern and eastern Ukraine are divided by Soviet-era windbreak tree lines. They provide cover from drones, assembly areas for assaults and concealed routes; on a static front a tree-line position can hold for months, but once found it is driven out by artillery and drones (source 7). In a March 2026 report, an officer from a brigade's unmanned systems battalion said that each year after March, as the tree lines turn green, small quadcopters lose much of their effectiveness and Russian infantry gains a seasonal advantage. He proposed fixed-wing reconnaissance drones and mining the tree lines before leaf-out (source 9). The article carries a sponsored-content label and gives no figures, so it is treated only as qualitative testimony.
- After leaf fall: CEPA's analysis holds that once the leaves fall, tree-line positions are exposed within days to weeks, opening a four- to five-week window that favours offensive action (source 8, analyst view).
- Snow: The same analysis notes that snow makes even empty trenches stand out as lines of a different colour (source 8).
- Mud: Spring and autumn mud (rasputitsa) restricts vehicles. In October 2023 one analyst expected autumn mud to halt operations until the ground froze in late December or early January (source 11).
There is circumstantial evidence that foliage is itself contested. A RUSI commentary in September 2024 described Ukrainian incendiary FPV drones being used mainly as a kind of "defoliant" to strip tree cover (source 10). Defenders wait for the leaves; attackers either strip them or use the leaf-on season to infiltrate.
Figure 3. Calendar of movement windows. A qualitative schematic, not measured detection rates. Leaf-on and leaf-off dates vary by year and region, so the edges are blurred — Own work, based on sources 1, 7–9, 11
Case: The Drained Kakhovka Reservoir Bed
The bed of the Kakhovka reservoir shows the same principle in extreme form. After the dam was destroyed on 6 June 2023, more than 1,000 km² of the roughly 2,155 km² reservoir floor was exposed (source 12, commercial satellite analysis). By the end of September 2023 vegetation covered about 524 km² (source 13, abstract figures), and a peer-reviewed paper found willows over 4 m tall on organic-rich sediment within a year (source 14).
A December 2025 report said Russian troops were using this forest and reed bed as an infiltration route, crawling through it to bypass flanks, and that both sides were laying mines there. This is a Ukrainian claim; in the same article a spokesperson for Ukraine's southern defence forces countered that there is nowhere to hide from drones (source 15). Where maps still show water, a war-made forest has grown, and that forest has become a corridor that lowers the cost of movement. Terrain is not a fixed condition; the war itself changes it.
Confirmed and Claimed
| Item |
Figure or fact |
Nature of evidence |
| Firing positions ~50 m apart, groups of 2–3, section frontage 70–200 m |
Fieldwork, Nov 2024–Jan 2025 |
Confirmed (independent institute fieldwork) |
| Dense observation 3 km, observation 15 km, tasking 40 km |
Published Feb 2025 |
Confirmed (fieldwork, includes analytic judgement) |
| More than a month in position; "rotation risk outweighs rest" |
Early 2025 |
Confirmed (multiple commander interviews) |
| About 50% of losses occur moving in the rear |
Early 2025 |
Claimed (brigade self-reporting; "rear" not defined) |
| 165 days in one position |
Reported Dec 2025 |
Claimed (individual testimony) |
| Neighbour gaps of 200 m to 1 km; positions "on paper" |
Reported Oct 2025 |
Claimed (soldier accounts, no official confirmation) |
| Danger-zone depth of 20 or 25 km |
May 2025–Feb 2026 |
Claimed (secondary reports, definitions differ) |
| Leaf-on degrades quadcopter observation |
Reported Mar 2026 |
Claimed (qualitative testimony, sponsored label) |
| Kakhovka bed used as an infiltration route |
Reported Dec 2025 |
Claimed (Ukrainian side, disputed) |
Counter-Arguments and Limits
Technology is solving the bottleneck. This is the strongest objection. Ukraine's Defence Ministry approved about 30 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and remote weapon stations for operational use in the first half of 2025 (source 16) and planned 15,000 robotic systems for 2025 (a March 2025 plan figure, source 17). A January 2026 Atlantic Council piece, citing the BBC, said UGVs carried up to 90% of forward resupply around Pokrovsk, though this is a re-quotation without methodology (source 18). Yet the objection supports the argument more than it weakens it: that a state has invested this much in robotic resupply and evacuation is itself evidence that human movement has become prohibitively expensive. In the same piece a former commander-in-chief said robots cannot replace infantry at scale, and RUSI judged UGV evacuation in early 2025 insufficiently reliable (sources 1, 18). The spread of fibre-optic drones, which emit nothing and are hard to jam, does not change the fact that robots and people must cross the same danger zone (source 19).
A one-sided sample. Most key figures come from one RUSI report, drawn from interviews and self-reporting by Ukrainian units. Where "the rear" begins and how the 50% was counted are not disclosed. No open source found here describes Russian rotation practice at the same resolution.
The direction of causation. Rare rotation could stem from plain manpower shortage rather than surveillance. The open evidence suggests the two reinforce each other: commanders judged rotation too risky regardless of manpower, and the problem persisted after the mobilisation age was lowered to 25 (April 2024) and a one-year contract for 18–24-year-olds was introduced (February 2025: more than 10,000 applications, but at most about 500 enlistments in two months) (source 20).
The evidence for the seasonal cycle. No quantitative study linking leaf area to drone detection rates or assault tempo was found. The current evidence is three qualitative sources (CEPA 2023, the Washington Post 2024, a battalion officer in 2026) pointing the same way.
Implications
What follows is analytic inference drawn from the sources above. It is not a conclusion backed by doctrine or by an official after-action review.
For Platoon and Company Leaders (inference)
- Decisions move down. When groups of two or three hold positions alone for weeks, decisions such as whether to move, whether to bring a wounded comrade back now, or whether to abandon a position fall to groups with no NCO present. Conversely, RUSI found that command of drone reconnaissance and coordination of FPV fire missions have been centralised at battalion and brigade command posts (source 1). Training should cover both "deciding alone whether to move" and "calling for fire from a screen you cannot see".
- Treat relief as a formal tactical action. Give reliefs and handovers a flank security plan, covering fire and time control. The moment of relief and the unit boundary are the gaps the enemy is looking for.
- Budget movement. A company commander should work out how many days each position can last on what drones can carry, and when the next night, fog or rain window will come. Position strength should be set within the ceiling that resupply allows.
- "Rear" personnel need the same training. Do not assume the first 15 km are safe. Cooks, drivers and medics need the same counter-drone survival training as riflemen.
- Change the default for casualty care. Teach "keep them alive and wait for the window" rather than "run out and get them".
- Plan by season. Defenders should block tree-line approaches with obstacles before leaf-out and build overhead cover that does not depend on foliage. Attackers should treat the weeks after leaf fall as a time for observation and fires, and the leaf-on season as a time for infiltration.
For the ROK Army (inference)
- Peacetime turnover is a permanent rotation. Conscripts and junior leaders with fixed terms of service turn over continuously. If, as the Ukrainian case suggests, the moment of relief leaves flanks open, then replacing whole teams and sections and drilling handovers matters more for wartime survivability than individual replacement.
- Keep units cohesive. RUSI found that new units equipped without experienced junior leaders struggled, that cohesive brigades consistently fought better, and recommended filling existing units rather than raising new ones (source 1). Systems that retain skilled section leaders and team leaders may matter as much as new weapons.
- Terrain differences need separate study. This analysis assumes Ukrainian plains and tree lines. How observation, concealment and the seasonal cycle differ on the steep, forested terrain of the Korean Peninsula needs its own research. No ROK Army data was used here, so this section is analogy.
Sources
- RUSI, "Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War" (2025-02, public copy hosted by NATO JALLC). https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205%20%281%29.pdf (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Kyiv Independent, report on two soldiers spending 165 days in one position (2025-12-10). https://kyivindependent.com/one-front-line-position-two-soldiers-165-days/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Ukrainska Pravda, report on widening gaps between front-line positions (2025-10-06). https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/10/06/8001358/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Meduza, summary of the Ukrainska Pravda report (2025-10-06). https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/10/06/as-gaps-widen-along-the-front-ukraine-is-reportedly-struggling-to-hold-back-russia-s-advance (accessed 2026-10-16)
- AFP (via Malay Mail), drone technology and the changing battlefield (2026-02-25). https://www.malaymail.com/news/world/2026/02/25/from-ai-to-starlink-how-drone-tech-is-reshaping-war-in-ukraine/210218 (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Euromaidan Press, summary of a Forbes report on drones over the roads to the front (2025-05-10). https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/05/10/forbes-ukraines-drones-haunt-every-road-to-the-front-but-russia-keeps-sending-men/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Washington Post (via Stars and Stripes), farmland and tree lines (2024-10-28). https://stripes.com/theaters/europe/2024-10-28/ukraine-farming-vital-battlefield-land-15653560.html (accessed 2026-10-16)
- CEPA, "Ukraine's War of the Treelines" (2023-10-02). https://cepa.org/article/ukraines-war-of-the-treelines/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Euromaidan Press, an unmanned systems battalion officer on Russia's spring advantage (2026-03-05, sponsored-content label). https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/03/05/a-ukrainian-drone-operator-explains-russias-spring-advantage-and-the-two-things-that-can-neutralize-it/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- RUSI, commentary on incendiary drones (2024-09). https://www.rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/ukraines-fire-dropping-drones-can-find-shock-russian-troops-experts (accessed 2026-10-16)
- NBC (via NBC Bay Area), the counteroffensive before winter and the mud season (2023-10). https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/business/money-report/theyre-running-out-of-time-ukraines-counteroffensive-is-gaining-urgency-as-winter-approaches/3351286/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- EOS Data Analytics, satellite comparison after the Kakhovka dam's destruction (commercial analysis, imagery Jun 2023–Jun 2024). https://eos.com/blog/life-after-kakhovka-dam-destruction-a-new-beginning/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Kherson State Agrarian and Economic University repository, study of vegetated area on the former Kakhovka reservoir (abstract). https://dspace.ksaeu.kherson.ua/handle/123456789/12334 (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Journal of Landscape Ecology, vegetation formation on the former Kakhovka reservoir bed (2024-09). https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/jlecol-2024-0014 (accessed 2026-10-16)
- RFE/RL, report on Russian attacks across the drained reservoir bed (2025-12-26). https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-attacks-drained-reservoir-dam-destroyed-ukraine/33630023.html (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Ukraine Ministry of Defence, approval of nearly thirty ground robotic systems (2025). https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/nearly-thirty-ground-robotic-systems-approved-for-operational-use-since-the-beginning-of-the-year (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Kyiv Post, plan for 15,000 robotic systems in 2025 (2025-03). https://www.kyivpost.com/post/49960 (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Atlantic Council, Ukraine's robot army and the infantry in 2026 (2026-01-08). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-robot-army-will-be-crucial-in-2026-but-drones-cant-replace-infantry/ (accessed 2026-10-16)
- RUSI (Euronews interview), Russia's use of fibre-optic drones (2024-09). https://www.rusi.org/news-and-comment/in-the-news/ukraine-war-how-and-why-russia-using-almost-indetectable-drones (accessed 2026-10-16)
- Babel, applications and enlistments under the 18–24 one-year contract (2025-04). https://babel.ua/en/news/115511-the-ministry-of-defense-revealed-how-many-people-applied-for-a-voluntary-one-year-contract-in-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-for-18-24-y-o (accessed 2026-10-16)