Our training battles, and concluded engagements from modern wars in the news, analysed around their decision points, with maps, charts and sources.
- The Kursk Incursion, Opening Phase (August 2024): How Surprise Was Achieved and Where It Ran Out
On 6 August 2024 Ukrainian forces crossed into Russia's Kursk Oblast and within two weeks announced control of Sudzha. This analysis looks at how operational surprise was achieved and how decisions about culmination and the direction of exploitation shaped what followed.
- In depth | 73 Easting — why did a defence built to ambush end up being ambushed?
A closer look at Eagle Troop's fight on 26 February 1991 through grid geometry, reanalysis weather data, troop and platoon organisation and an hour-by-hour account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, checks the record against US Army FM 3-98, FM 3-90 and ADP 6-0, and sets the troop commander's accounts beside a simulation study that reran the battle with the Iraqi errors corrected.
- In depth | Valley of Tears — how did one brigade with no replacements outlast four nights?
A closer look at the 7th Armored Brigade's defence north of Kuneitra, 6–9 October 1973, through moon and terrain data, a company-level order of battle and an hour-by-hour account. It walks through the training scenario's nine decision points and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and against the sources' conflicting figures.
- In depth | Robotyne — why taking one village on foot took a month and did not reach Tokmak
A closer look at the fight for Robotyne in July–August 2023 through elevation and weather data, the order of battle down to company level and a day-by-day account. It follows the training scenario's ten decision points, sets them against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and RUSI's findings, and weighs where the sources disagree on dates, rotations and reinforcements.
- In depth | Duc Co — how did a company in a shallow trench hold for six hours?
A closer look at the Tiger Division's 9th Company and its attached US tank platoon at LZ 27 Victor on 9–10 August 1966, through terrain and weather data, task organization and an hour-by-hour narrative. We walk through the nine decision points of the training scenario, asking what the commander knew and what other choices would have brought, and set the night against the perimeter-defence paragraphs of US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and against sources that disagree.
- In depth | Defending Vuhledar — how one open dirt road stopped an armoured offensive
A closer look at the defence of Vuhledar in January–February 2023 through terrain and weather data, unit organisation and a day-by-day account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the disputed loss figures.
- In depth | Hwaryeongjang — how intelligence turned into two ambushes
A closer look at how the ROK 17th Regiment struck two regiments of the NK 15th Division in turn at Hwaryeongjang, near Sangju, on 17–25 July 1950, using OSM coordinates, reanalysis weather and moon-phase data. It walks through the ten decision points of the training scenario (including two hypothetical ones), asks what the commanders knew and what other choices would have meant, and sets the ambush, delay and relief-in-place doctrine of US Army FM 3-90 (2023) against Korean and American sources that disagree.
- In depth | Novodarivka and Rivnopil — how the same units changed their method of attack in two weeks
A closer look at the June 2023 breakthrough at Novodarivka and Rivnopil through soil moisture and elevation data, company- and platoon-level organisation and a day-by-day account. It follows the training scenario's ten decision points, asking what commanders knew and what other choices would have brought, and sets them against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the places where the sources disagree.
- In depth | Krynky — why a foothold that held for nine months could never become a bridgehead
A closer look at the Krynky operation from October 2023 to July 2024 through elevation, darkness and temperature data, the order of battle down to battalion level and a month-by-month account. It follows the training scenario's decision points, reads them against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) on gap crossing, defence of a linear obstacle and withdrawal, and weighs where the sources disagree on dates, strength, losses and the timing of the withdrawal.
- In depth | Chuncheon–Hongcheon — how an outgunned regiment broke a corps timetable
The ROK 6th Division's 7th Regiment at Chuncheon, 25–30 June 1950, re-examined through terrain and weather data, battalion- and company-level organisation and an hour-by-hour narrative. We walk through the training scenario's ten decision points, weigh what the commander knew and what other choices would have cost, and set the sources against each other and against US Army FM 3-90 (2023).
- In depth | White Horse Hill — what finally held a crest that changed hands seven times in ten days?
A closer look at the battle for White Horse Hill (6–15 October 1952) through terrain and weather data, regiment-to-company organisation and a day-by-day account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points and checks the record against the US Army's FM 100-5 (1941) and the conflicting sources.
- In depth | Operation Hong Kil Dong — why seven battalions lost the enemy main body
A closer look at the seven South Korean battalions that converged on the 'Hub' massif in Phu Yen Province from 9 July to late August 1967, using terrain and weather figures, a battalion-level order of battle and a dated sequence of events. It follows the training scenario's seven decision points, weighs what commanders knew and what other choices might have done, and reads the operation against the search-and-attack and encirclement guidance in US Army FM 3-90 (2023).
- In depth | Second Battle of Fallujah — who owns the ground an armoured spearhead leaves behind?
A closer look at TF 2-2, the Army mechanized task force on the eastern flank of Operation AL FAJR, through street-level geography, weather and moonlight, company-level organisation and an hour-by-hour account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, re-reads them against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the urban doctrine of 2003, and sets the disputed figures side by side.
- In depth | Tra Binh Dong — Why didn't the breached company base fall?
The defence of the Blue Dragon Brigade's 11th Company base on 14–15 February 1967, re-examined through the base layout, weather and moonlight, attached weapons and a minute-by-minute account. It walks the training scenario's decision points p1–p7 and sets the fight against the perimeter-defence paragraphs of US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the conflicting Korean, American and Vietnamese records.
- In depth | Yeongcheon — how reinforcements arriving one regiment at a time surrounded a division that had broken through
A day-by-day look at the Yeongcheon corridor, 5–12 September 1950: the breakthrough in the rain, a town that changed hands twice, enemy guns that ran out of shells, and a ring closed from three sides. It follows the training scenario's eleven decision points and sets the record against US Army ADP 3-90 (2019) and against sources that disagree.
- In depth | Hostomel Airport — how a lost airfield still denied Russia its air bridge
A closer look at the fight for Hostomel (Antonov) airport on 24–25 February 2022 through weather and map data, unit organisation and an hour-by-hour account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, reads them against US joint and Army air assault doctrine, and sets the conflicting accounts side by side.
- In depth | Goose Green — how a battalion short of fire broke a defence on an isthmus with no flanks
A closer look at 2 PARA's attack on Darwin and Goose Green on 28–29 May 1982, using hourly weather reconstruction, the real geography of the isthmus, accounts from both armies and the contemporary despatch. It walks through all ten phases of the training scenario, re-reads the battle against US FM 3-90 (2023) and British Land Operations doctrine, and sets the conflicting times, strengths and surrender dates side by side.
- In depth | Defending the Pokrovsk Axis — how long can drones hold ground the supply line cannot reach?
A closer look at one year on the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad axis, December 2024 to December 2025, through terrain and weather data, unit organisation and a month-by-month account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, reads them against US Army FM 3-90 (2023), and compares the conflicting figures for advance rates, infiltration and control.
- In depth | Kharkiv Counteroffensive — how far can an exploitation run on one road?
A closer look at the September 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive through terrain and weather data, the units on both sides and a day-by-day account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, reads the operation against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) on exploitation and pursuit, and sets the conflicting dates and figures side by side.
- In depth | Yongmunsan — how an outpost left alone far forward became the springboard for a division counterattack
The battle of Yongmunsan, 17–23 May 1951, re-read through coordinates, elevation and weather data, battalion-level organization and an hour-by-hour narrative. We follow the training scenario's ten decision points (two of them what-ifs), and set the action against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and against Korean, American and Chinese sources that disagree.
- In depth | Hyeon-ri — who held the only way out first?
How the ROK III Corps lost nearly all its equipment and scattered into the mountains after a Chinese battalion blocked Omachi pass, 16–20 May 1951, re-read through elevation, weather and moon data, battalion-level organisation and an hour-by-hour account. It follows the training scenario's ten decision points and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the 1941 FM 100-5.
- In depth | Bilohorivka Crossing — when should the defender fire at a crossing it saw coming?
The May 2022 defeat of a Russian crossing of the Siverskyi Donets at Bilohorivka, re-examined through elevation and weather data, both sides' order of battle and a day-by-day timeline. We walk through the training scenario's decision points p1–p7, read the battle against US FM 3-90 (2023) and Russian crossing principles, and compare sources that disagree on attempts, losses and whether there was a ground counterattack.
- In depth | Skybyn–Brovary ambush — how a battalion short of anti-tank missiles stopped a tank column
The ambush on the M01 north of Brovary on 9–10 March 2022, re-examined with map and weather data, both sides' organisation and a phase-by-phase timeline. It follows the scenario's ten phases against US Army FM 3-90 and Russian march doctrine, and sets the conflicting reports on date, units and losses side by side.
- In depth | Tabu-dong — how a regiment that stopped held the valley
A closer look at the US 27th Infantry in the "Bowling Alley" north of Tabu-dong and the ROK 1st Division on the ridges either side, 18–26 August 1950, through terrain and weather data, company-level dispositions and a day-by-day account. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and conflicting sources.
- In depth | Kapyong — how the battalion on Hill 677 lasted a night cut off
A closer look at the Kapyong valley battle of 23–25 April 1951 through elevation, moonlight and weather data, company-level organisation and an hour-by-hour account. It walks through the training scenario's nine decision points, including two what-if phases, and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the places where the official histories disagree.
- In depth | Mogadishu — why did a relief force need eight hours to cover three kilometres?
A closer look at the relief of Task Force Ranger on 3–4 October 1993, from the alert of the UN Quick Reaction Force to the arrival at the Pakistani stadium. It rebuilds the night hour by hour with light and weather data and OpenStreetMap geography, walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90 (2023) and the conflicting figures in the official histories.
- In depth | An Khe Pass — why the hill fell three days before the road opened
A closer look at the April 1972 fight for the An Khe Pass, using elevation and weather data, a company-level order of battle and an hour-by-hour account. It walks through the ten decision points of the training scenario, asks what the commander knew and what other choices would have cost, and sets US Army FM 3-90 (2023) against conflicting press reports and Korean records.
- In depth | The Avdiivka withdrawal — what does it take to cover a decision that comes late?
A closer look at the last days of Avdiivka in February 2024 through terrain and weather data, unit organisation and an hour-by-hour account of 13–17 February. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points, checks them against the withdrawal chapter of US Army FM 3-90 (2023), and sets conflicting figures for prisoners, timings and prepared positions side by side.
- In depth | Chipyong-ni — when, and where, to commit the reserve
A closer look at the encircled defence of Chipyong-ni in February 1951 through company dispositions, an hour-by-hour account and weather and daylight data. It walks through the training scenario's ten decision points and checks the record against US Army FM 3-90's perimeter-defence and reserve paragraphs and the disputed figures.
- In depth | Chosin, Toktong Pass — how a 240-man company held a division's road open for five days
A closer look at Fox Company's defence of Toktong Pass, 27 November to 2 December 1950, through elevation data, weather reanalysis, moon tables and an hour-by-hour account. It follows the training scenario's decision phases p1–p8 (with the what-if phases pB and p4f), checks them against US Army FM 3-90 (2023), and compares the disputed strength, loss and temperature figures.
- Chosin, Toktong Pass (November–December 1950): six days holding the back gate
From 27 November to 2 December 1950, Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines held an isolated hill in Toktong Pass, midway along the Yudam-ni–Hagaru-ri road, on its own. This analysis covers the siting of the position, the decision to stand rather than break out, and the judgements around airdrops and recovering ammunition.
- Defending Vuhledar (January–February 2023): An Open Track, Mined Fields and a Stalled Armoured Offensive
The month from 24 January to 23 February 2023 in which Russian naval infantry brigades attacked Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast and stalled. This analysis looks at how Ukrainian forces combined high ground, mines, anti-tank weapons and artillery into an engagement area, and why Russian forces kept repeating the same attack, through both sides' decisions.
- The Avdiivka Withdrawal (February 2024): Covering a Late Decision
How Ukrainian forces lost the supply route into Avdiivka and withdrew between 13 and 17 February 2024 after holding it for four months. The decisions over committing a reserve brigade, small-group infiltration, holding the corridor and withdrawing on foot are examined from both sides.
- Kapyong (April 1951): how Hill 677 held after the far side of the valley emptied
The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade stopped the CPV 118th Division in the Kapyong River valley on 23–25 April 1951. This analysis follows the decisions behind the Australian daylight withdrawal, the Canadian re-siting of B Company, defensive fire called onto a company's own position, and the airdrop that kept a cut-off battalion in place.
- Chipyong-ni (February 1951): three days in a tight ring
From 13 to 15 February 1951 the US 23rd Regimental Combat Team and the French Battalion held the Chipyong-ni crossroads while surrounded by Chinese forces. This analysis follows the decisions behind the tight low-ground perimeter, the order to stand, the handling of the reserve and the relief.
- The Krynky Bridgehead (October 2023 – July 2024): The Cost of Holding a Foothold Across the River
Ukrainian marines established a foothold at Krynky on the left bank of the Dnipro in October 2023 and held it for nearly nine months, but the bridgehead never expanded and a withdrawal around June 2024 was reported. This analysis looks at the decisions involved in holding a bridgehead that depended on small boats on a drone-dominated battlefield, and at what it cost.
- An Khe Pass (April 1972): to open the road, take the hill first
In April 1972 the Cavalry Regiment of the ROK Capital (Tiger) Division spent sixteen days driving the PAVN 3rd Division's 12th Regiment off Route 19 and reopening the An Khe Pass. This analysis looks at how an attack on Hill 638 that had stalled for ten days was carried by small-unit leaders going first, and at the decisions between taking the hill and opening the road.
- Valley of Tears (October 1973): four days for an armoured brigade holding until the reserves came
An analysis of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade's defence of the valley between Mount Hermonit and Booster ridge on the northern Golan, 6–9 October 1973. It looks at prepared firing positions, rotating repair and resupply, the flank use of a small reserve and the retaking of the ramps on the last day, from both sides.
- Tra Binh Dong (February 1967): one night in an isolated company base
From the night of 14 February to the morning of 15 February 1967, 11th Company of the ROK 2nd Marine Brigade (Blue Dragon) held its isolated hilltop base south-west of Chu Lai against a regiment-sized attack. This analysis looks at the company-level decisions on the listening post, containing the breach before counterattacking and silencing the enemy weapon outside the wire, alongside the gaps between the accounts.
- Mogadishu (October 1993): A Coalition Column to Reach a Force Cut Off in the City
After two Black Hawks were shot down over Mogadishu on 3–4 October 1993, the UN Quick Reaction Force built a column of US infantry, Malaysian APCs and Pakistani tanks, linked up with the trapped Rangers and brought them out. This analysis looks at the route choice, the coalition task organization and the decision to stay at the crash site.
- Yongmunsan (May 1951): The Outpost Left Alone That Took the Offensive's Weight
From 17 to 20 May 1951 the 2nd Regiment of the ROK 6th Division held its outposts south of Cheongpyeong Lake against the CPV 63rd Army, and the division went straight over to the counterattack. The analysis looks at both sides' decisions: holding after the neighbours pulled back, all-round defence and consolidation at night, and the timing of the counterattack.
- Hyeon-ri (May 1951): A Corps on a Single Road
Between 16 and 20 May 1951 a CPV force broke through a neighbouring corps and blocked Omachi pass, and ROK III Corps, which depended on that one road, lost most of its equipment and fell back over mountain trails. The analysis draws lessons from the defeat on rear-route security, use of the reserve, attacking a mountain roadblock and controlling a withdrawal.
- Second Battle of Fallujah (November 2004): an armour-led attack through a city, and the ground left behind
An analysis of Operation AL FAJR, in which the 1st Marine Division attacked through Fallujah from north to south in November 2004, centred on the decisions of the Army mechanized task force (TF 2-2) in the eastern sector. It looks at how speed and thoroughness, the seam with a neighbouring unit and ammunition supply interacted.
- Yeongcheon (September 1950): Retaking a Broken Corridor by Shifting Regiments
In September 1950 the North Korean 15th Division broke the ROK 8th Division's line and reached the Yeongcheon corridor linking Taegu and Gyeongju, only to be surrounded and broken by two regiments rushed from other fronts and a reorganized 8th Division. This analysis looks at the decision to counterattack straight after the breakthrough, the shift of reserve regiments, and the enemy artillery's overextended advance.
- Robotyne (July–August 2023): An Offensive That Crossed the Minefields on Foot
How Ukrainian forces, their mechanised breach stalled on the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis, retook Robotyne with dismounted assault groups and hand-cleared lanes (26 July – 28 August 2023). The decision to continue the offensive, Russia's defensive adaptations and company-level choices on breaching, resupply and flank security are examined.
- Hwaryeongjang (July 1950): Two Ambushes Built on Intelligence
From 17 to 25 July 1950 the ROK 17th Regiment and ROK 1st Division stopped the North Korean 15th Division as it came over the Sobaek range toward Sangju. This analysis looks at how a resident's tip, captured couriers and captured orders turned into ambush decisions, and how the regiment handled the division's counterattack.
- The Bilohorivka Crossing (May 2022): A Predicted Crossing Site and Fires That Waited
In May 2022 a Russian motor rifle brigade tried to cross the Siverskyi Donets and lost its pontoon bridges and armoured elements before falling back. This analysis looks at how Ukrainian forces narrowed down the crossing site and chose when to fire, and why the Russian force left out the basic requirements of a gap crossing.
- The Skybyn–Brovary Ambush (March 2022): A Tank Column Stopped on a Narrow Road
On 10 March 2022, on the M01 road at the northern edge of Brovary east of Kyiv, a Ukrainian mechanized battalion used layered ambushes to stop a Russian tank regiment's battalion tactical group (BTG). Because most of the detail comes from a participant's account, this analysis separates independently confirmed facts from claims.
- Operation Hong Kil Dong (July–August 1967): a converging attack on a mountain base and a trail gone cold
From 9 July to 26 August 1967 seven battalions of two ROK divisions converged on 'the Hub', a mountain base area north-west of Tuy Hoa. This analysis looks at how a slow, methodical encirclement trapped part of the enemy, and at the decision on where to search in phase 2 once the main body had been lost.
- Hostomel Airport (February 2022): The Airfield That Never Became an Air Bridge
On 24 February 2022 Russian airborne troops (VDV) seized Hostomel airport north-west of Kyiv by helicopter assault, but Ukrainian artillery, a counterattack and a cratered runway kept it from ever serving as an air bridge. This analysis looks at the decisions of a largely conscript defending force and of both commands.
- Defending the Pokrovsk Axis (December 2024 – December 2025): Ground Held by Drones, Supply Lines Cut
A year on the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad axis, December 2024 to December 2025. How Ukrainian forces used drones to make up for scarce infantry and slow the Russian advance, and how Russian forces broke that defence by interdicting supply roads with drones and infiltrating small teams, analysed through both sides' decisions.
- 73 Easting (February 1991): a cavalry troop in a sandstorm and the limit of advance
On the afternoon of 26 February 1991, Eagle Troop of the US 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment struck the defensive positions and then the reserve of the Republican Guard Tawakalna Division in a sandstorm. This analysis looks at how the change of formation on contact, the decision to go past the limit of advance and the Iraqi defensive layout shaped the result.
- The Kharkiv Counteroffensive (September 2022): Exploiting a Thin Line and Cutting the Supply Hub
The Ukrainian counteroffensive that opened north-west of Balakliia on 6 September 2022 reached Kupiansk and the Oskil river within ten days. This analysis looks at how bypassing strongpoints and cutting a supply hub forced the Izium grouping to withdraw, and where the exploitation reached its culminating point.
- Tabu-dong (August 1950): The Allied Defence That Blocked the "Bowling Alley"
From 18 to 25 August 1950 the US 27th Infantry held the valley floor north of Taegu while the ROK 1st Division held the ridges on either side, stopping the North Korean 13th Division's push down the Tabu-dong corridor. This analysis looks at the decision to tie valley and ridges into one defence, the use of pre-planned fires, and a test of allied trust.
- Novodarivka and Rivnopil (June 2023): Two Ways to Break In, One Fortnight
How Ukrainian forces broke through the Russian fighting positions at Novodarivka and Rivnopil in the first two weeks of the June 2023 southern offensive. A mounted breach that cost two companies' worth of equipment is compared, decision by decision, with a fix-deceive-infiltrate attack that cost little.
- Chuncheon–Hongcheon (June 1950): Three Days Bought with a River and Guns
How the ROK 6th Division delayed NK II Corps at Chuncheon and Hongcheon from 25 to 30 June 1950. The analysis follows both sides' decisions, centred on a defence built on the Soyang River and pre-planned fires, a limited attack within the defence, and the covered withdrawal through Wonchang Pass.
- White Horse Hill (October 1952): ten days of counterattack and relief
From 6 to 15 October 1952 the ROK 9th Division fought the CPV 38th Army for Hill 395 north-west of Cheorwon. This analysis looks at how husbanding the reserve, immediate counterattacks and a passage of lines kept the hill in ROK hands.
- Goose Green (May 1982): a parachute battalion short of fire support crosses an open isthmus
An analysis of the attack by the British 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) on the Argentine garrison of the Darwin–Goose Green isthmus, East Falkland, on 28–29 May 1982, ending in its surrender. It looks at thin fire support, a night attack that ran into daylight, the shift of effort after command changed hands and the surrender negotiation, from both sides.
- Duc Co (August 1966): one night at a company tactical base
On the night of 9–10 August 1966, at LZ 27 Victor near the Cambodian border, 9th Company of the Tiger Division's Cavalry Regiment and an attached US tank platoon held off a PAVN battalion. This analysis looks at the decisions on listening posts, all-round defence, Korean–US fire coordination and the dawn sweep.