The Kharkiv Counteroffensive (September 2022): Exploiting a Thin Line and Cutting the Supply Hub

2026-10-13 · 2022-09-06 – 2022-09-16

Overview (BLUF)

Before dawn on 6 September 2022, Ukrainian forces broke the Russian line north-west of Balakliia in Kharkiv Oblast, around Verbivka and Volokhiv Yar. The exploitation echelon bypassed strongpoints, covered about 75 km along the P07 road in three days and reached Kupiansk on the 9th. Kupiansk was the rail and road hub that kept the Russian grouping at Izium supplied. On the 10th the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that forces around Balakliia and Izium would "regroup" towards Donetsk, and the Izium grouping fell back across the Oskil, leaving much of its heavy equipment behind. ISW estimated that about 2,500 km² had been retaken by the 9th.

RUSI attributes the outcome to Russia's shortage of troops rather than to poor morale. Ukraine could not hide its intention to attack, but it achieved surprise in timing, and it went for the supply hub of the strong enemy force rather than for the force itself.

Background and Strategic Context

By late summer 2022 Russian forces had spent heavily in the Donbas offensive, and when Ukraine signalled a counteroffensive at Kherson, Russia moved many of its reserves south (RUSI, Jamestown). The Russian "West" grouping on the Kharkiv axis lacked the troops to build proper defensive density. The line north-west of Balakliia was thinly held by Rosgvardia special police (SOBR) units.

The Izium salient was a springboard threatening Sloviansk from the north, and it depended on the rail and road junction at Kupiansk (Long War Journal). Cut Kupiansk, and the whole salient loses its footing without a frontal attack on Izium.

Terrain and Weather

South-eastern Kharkiv Oblast is open farmland broken by tree lines, with extensive woods north of the Siverskyi Donets. The only good east–west road was the P07, with Shevchenkove as its junction. To the east, the Oskil river and reservoir run north–south from Kupiansk down to Izium, and Kupiansk sits astride the river (Figure 1). The river screened the Ukrainian flank and funnelled any Russian withdrawal through a few crossings (Jamestown). Early September appears to have imposed no serious limits on cross-country movement, but we could not find weather records for the operation.

Forces and Dispositions

Ukraine: while attention was on Kherson, several mechanised and air assault brigades were massed on the Kharkiv axis. Breakthrough and exploitation echelons were separated, with territorial defence brigades following to deal with bypassed strongpoints. Forces were concentrated at the breakthrough points to create local superiority (Jamestown).
Russia: the front was thinly held, mainly by Rosgvardia units. A larger grouping at Izium was pinned by Ukrainian pressure towards Lyman and could not be shifted to Kupiansk. Reinforcements, apparently including elements of the 90th Guards Tank Division and possibly the newly formed 3rd Army Corps, arrived too late (Long War Journal). Little Russian air activity was reported after the 6th.

Course of the Action

Schematic map of the Kharkiv counteroffensive: the main axis from the 6 September front through Volokhiv Yar and Shevchenkove to Kupiansk, branches towards Senkove and the border, Oskil crossings, the Russian withdrawal east from Izium and late-arriving Russian reserves — Figure 1. Kharkiv counteroffensive, schematic (6–16 Sep 2022). Town positions follow the scenario map and are approximate; not the current situation — Own work, based on sources 2–7

Breach (6–7 September): the attack opened before dawn on the 6th around Verbivka and Volokhiv Yar, and the Russian line broke quickly. ISW assessed on the 7th that Ukrainian forces had used tactical surprise to advance about 20 km (secondary reporting).
Exploitation (7–9 September): the exploitation echelon bypassed Volokhiv Yar and Shevchenkove and drove east on the P07. On the 8th the regional governor announced that the Ukrainian flag had been raised in Balakliia. On the 9th the lead elements reached the outskirts of Kupiansk while other formations headed south-east for the Oskil crossings at Senkove and Horokhovatka.
Izium pull-out (10–11 September): part of Kupiansk was taken on the 10th and the Russian MoD announced its "regrouping". Once it was clear that the highways and the rail line to the north had been cut, the Izium grouping left in haste, abandoning tanks, self-propelled guns and other equipment. Oryx counted more than 580 visually confirmed Russian equipment losses between 7 and 13 September (Long War Journal).
The Oskil and Kupiansk (12–16 September): another formation reached the border near Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk (by about the 12th). The Oskil was reportedly crossed at several points around the 13th. ISW assessed that by the 16th the whole of Kupiansk, including the eastern districts, was under Ukrainian control. After that the pace of the advance dropped markedly.

Figure 2. Kharkiv counteroffensive timeline. Colour shows the nature of each item (blue: Ukrainian statement or claim, red: Russian statement, amber: independent assessment) — Own work, based on sources 3–7

Decision Point Analysis

Matrix of four decision points with the options considered and the course taken: DP1 bypass and drive east on the P07, DP2 seize the Kupiansk hub and the Oskil crossings at the same time, DP3 Russian withdrawal across the Oskil, DP4 small bridgeheads plus refit — Figure 3. Options and choices at each decision point. Amber borders mark the course taken. The option sets are reconstructed from open sources and the scenario, not from actual orders — Own work, based on sources 1–4

DP 1: what to do about Balakliia once the breach opened (Ukrainian exploitation echelon, 7 September) The options were (a) clear Balakliia with the whole brigade first, (b) leave Balakliia to follow-on forces and drive east on the P07 at once, (c) halt in the breach to resupply, or (d) widen the shoulders of the breach. The course taken was (b). Getting into depth before Russian reserves arrived appears to have been judged worth more than the flank risk. Balakliia was secured by about the 8th and the lead pushed on to Shevchenkove. This is the scenario's phase 2, "The breach is open".

DP 2: where to strike from the Shevchenkove junction (Ukrainian axis, 8–9 September) The choices were to halt at Shevchenkove, turn south against the Izium grouping, seize the Kupiansk hub, or take the Oskil crossings. Across the axis, forces were split to go for Kupiansk and the crossings together. ISW assessed on the 9th that cutting the supply lines north and south of Izium could create an encirclement. Rather than fight the strong Izium grouping head-on, Ukraine cut the rail and roads it depended on, and Izium was emptied without a major battle. This corresponds to the scenario's phases 3 and 4.

DP 3: hold or withdraw (Russian command, 9–10 September) Russia's options were roughly to reinforce and hold Izium, counterattack at Kupiansk, or pull back across the Oskil. The reinforcements came too late and the Izium troops were tied down towards Lyman. Russia withdrew and called it "regrouping". ISW judged it not a controlled withdrawal but a hurried departure to escape encirclement. Many troops got out, but large amounts of heavy equipment and ammunition were left behind.

DP 4: what to do at the Oskil (Ukraine, 12–13 September) Supply lines now stretched more than 70 km and units had been moving and fighting for a week. Of (a) an immediate assault crossing in Kupiansk itself, (b) small bridgeheads at several points while the main body resupplied and refitted, or (c) going over to the defence on the west bank, (b) appears to have been chosen. The offensive continued east of the Oskil and towards Lyman, but the speed of the first week did not return, a sign that the exploitation was approaching culmination. This is the scenario's phase 6, "The Oskil".

Lessons

Surprise and intelligence: surprise is possible even when intent is known, if timing and place are concealed. The signalled Kherson counteroffensive drew Russian reserves south.
Exploitation and mission command: bypassing strongpoints at speed only worked because follow-on forces were assigned to deal with what was bypassed. Subordinate units need to pick their next objective themselves within the higher intent.
Choosing the decisive point: striking the supply hub a strong force depends on, rather than the force itself, can make it abandon its positions without a battle.
Sustainment and culmination: a supply line running along a single road brings culmination closer with every kilometre. Pausing at the river line was a recognition of that limit.
For the defender: an undermanned defence has no depth. When reserves arrive late, a break in one place turns into the withdrawal of an entire salient.

Unresolved Questions

Area retaken: the ISW estimate (about 2,500 km² by the 9th), the Ukrainian claim (more than 3,000 km² by the 11th) and later, larger figures use different dates and bases and cannot be compared directly.
Sources disagree on whether Balakliia was fully secured on the 8th or the 10th.
The date of the Oskil crossings (about the 13th) rests on a Wikipedia cross-check. How many Oskil bridges Russian forces destroyed as they withdrew is not confirmed.
An occupation official's claim that Russian forces were outnumbered eight to one has not been independently verified.
There are no reliable personnel loss figures for either side, and no open source reconstructs brigade-level decisions. ISW's original pages returned 403, so summaries in other outlets were used.

Take command of the exploitation brigade yourself in the "Kharkiv Counteroffensive" scenario and see what happens when you choose differently at the same junctions.

Sources

RUSI, "Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine's Offensive Operations, 2022–23", pp. 9, 28, 30, 33 (2024-07). https://static.rusi.org/lessons-learned-ukraine-offensive-2022-23.pdf (accessed 2026-10-13)
Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor 19/133, sequence and mechanics of the Balakliia–Kupiansk offensive (2022-09-13). https://jamestown.org/ukrainian-balakliya-kupyansk-offensive-sequence-of-events-mechanics-and-consequences/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
FDD Long War Journal, Ukraine's counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson and the road ahead (2022-09-16). https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/09/ukraines-counteroffensives-in-kharkiv-and-kherson-and-the-road-ahead.php (accessed 2026-10-13)
AP (via MPR News), Russia announces troop pullback from the Kharkiv area (2022-09-10). https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/09/10/russia-announces-troop-pullback-from-ukraines-kharkiv-area (accessed 2026-10-13)
Axios, further Ukrainian gains in the Kharkiv region and area claim (2022-09-11). https://www.axios.com/2022/09/11/ukraine-troops-advance-kharkiv (accessed 2026-10-13)
ISW, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 9 and 10 September 2022 (original returned 403; confirmed via sources 4 and 7 and search summaries). https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9 , https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Novaya Gazeta Europe, summary of ISW's assessment that all of Kupiansk was under Ukrainian control (2022-09-17). https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2022/09/17/isw-ukraine-captures-all-of-kupiansk-news (accessed 2026-10-13)
Washington Post analysis (via Stars and Stripes), Russian equipment left behind at Izium (2022-09-14). https://stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-09-14/russia-surrender-izyum-tanks-7329753.html (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikipedia, "2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive" (date cross-check only). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Kharkiv_counteroffensive (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the photo of the Oskil near Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi (CC BY 4.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Beach,_Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi_(01).JPG (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the photo of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi station (CC BY 4.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi_Train_Station_(01).JPG (accessed 2026-10-13)