Chipyong-ni (February 1951): three days in a tight ring

2026-10-13 · 1951-02-13 – 1951-02-15

Overview (BLUF)

From 13 to 15 February 1951 the 23rd Regimental Combat Team (RCT), US 2nd Infantry Division, with the attached French Battalion, held the Chipyong-ni crossroads in central Korea while encircled by Chinese forces. The regiment did not hold the surrounding hills; it built a perimeter about 1.6 km across on the low inner ground and took two nights of attacks. Before dawn on the 15th it lost G Company's hill on the south rim, then retook it that afternoon by committing the reserve with air, artillery and tank support. That evening the tanks of Task Force Crombez broke in from the south, and the Chinese withdrew north during the night.

The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture calls it the first tactical success US forces won against the Chinese (source 3). It was a defence in which a position sized to the force, a higher commander's decision to stand backed by a promised relief, and a reserve kept until the end all fitted together.

US Army Center of Military History map of the Battle of Chipyong-ni, showing the regimental perimeter around the village, the battalion sectors, the surrounding hills and the roads — Photo 1. US Army Center of Military History (CMH) map of Chipyong-ni, showing the perimeter and the ground around it — Photo: US Center for Military History, public domain (PD-USGov-Military-Army), via Wikimedia Commons

Background and Strategic Context

By late January UN forces had stopped the retreat that followed China's intervention and were moving north again. The 23rd Infantry fought at the Twin Tunnels in late January and entered Chipyong-ni on 3 February. The village sat where north–south and east–west roads met a railway; in Chinese hands it would split the UN line and threaten the rear of the western front (source 3).

On the night of 11 February the Chinese struck US X Corps around Hoengsong and the line was pushed back toward Wonju, leaving Chipyong-ni as a salient jutting north (source 3). On the 13th the regimental commander asked to pull back about 24 km south to Yoju, and the corps commander passed the request on. The Eighth Army commander refused, ordered Chipyong-ni held as an anchor of the line, and directed an attack north to relieve it if it were cut off (sources 1, 5).

Terrain and Weather

Chipyong-ni lies in a bowl. Eight hills averaging about 850 feet (260 m) ring the village. Holding them all would have meant about 12 miles (19 km) of ridgeline and a perimeter 5–6 km across (source 1), far beyond the regiment's strength. About a mile south of the village the road ran through a cut some 150 yards long with banks 30–50 feet high (source 2). Snow covered the rice paddies, crusted knee-deep in places, and the cold jammed some weapons (source 1).

Schematic of the Battle of Chipyong-ni. A perimeter about 1.6 km across surrounds the crossroads, with the 1st Battalion to the north, the 3rd to the east, the 2nd to the south, the French Battalion to the west and the reserve in the centre. Eight hills ring it. Chinese attacks come from several directions on the nights of 13–14 and 14–15 February. Also shown: the daylight counterattack onto G Company's hill on the south rim on the 15th and the route of Task Force Crombez through the road cut to the south — Figure 1. Battle of Chipyong-ni, schematic (13–15 February 1951). Positions and scale are approximate — our own drawing, based on sources 1–3 and the CMH map

Forces and Dispositions

23rd RCT: three battalions of the 23rd Infantry, the French Battalion, the 1st Ranger Company, the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, B Battery of the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm), B Battery of the 82nd AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (six M16s and four M19s), an engineer company and regimental tanks. US figures quoted in a cross-check source give about 4,500 men, about 2,500 of them front-line infantry (source 5).
Layout: 1st Battalion north, 2nd south, 3rd east, French Battalion west. B Company and the Rangers were held as regimental reserve. At night engineers manned an inner second line, tanks stood close to the outer line, and gaps were mined or covered by machine guns (source 1).
CPV: the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture says eight regiments of the 39th, 40th and 42nd Armies attacked Chipyong-ni (source 3). A Chinese division commander's memoir claims only three regiments, about 3,000 men, actually attacked (source 5).

An M16 half-track with four coupled machine guns firing toward a hillside, with its crew around the vehicle — Photo 2. An M16 anti-aircraft half-track of the US 7th Infantry Division firing at ground targets on another part of the front, 12 March 1951. Six of these vehicles helped defend the Chipyong-ni perimeter — Photo: Hunkins, Jr. (US Army Signal Corps), public domain (PD-USGov-Military-Army), via Wikimedia Commons

Course of the Action

Preparation (3–12 February): for ten days the companies dug machine-gun positions, registered mortar targets and laid mines, and patrolled the surrounding hills daily.
Encirclement (13 February): a reconnaissance force sent down the southern road was turned back, and the regiment was in effect surrounded.
First night (2200, 13 February – 0730, 14 February): attacks came from the north-west, north and south-east. G Company was hit four times, and a regimental tank went to its support during the 0400 attack. Attacks at 0630 and 0730 also failed. The regimental commander was wounded in the leg by mortar fragments but kept command.
Daylight (14 February): 24 ammunition airdrops and several air strikes.
Second night (night of 14–15 February): from midnight companies on the north, west and east were attacked in turn. Ammunition was running out, and C-47s dropped flares all night. At 0230 I Company was penetrated and restored by the 3rd Battalion's own companies. G Company on the south rim had been losing ground since 2200 and lost the whole hill between 0230 and 0300.
Recapture and relief (15 February): a dawn counterattack by an F Company platoon and a Ranger platoon was stopped at about 0615. In daylight B Company and the Rangers attacked with air, artillery and tank support; pinned in the open at first, B Company took the hill at about 1630 after napalm strikes. Task Force Crombez set out at 1545 and entered the perimeter at about 1700. The Chinese withdrew north that night.

Timeline from 0600 on 13 February to midnight on 15/16 February. The perimeter row shows night-attack bars from 2200 on the 13th to 0730 on the 14th and from 2200 on the 14th to 0600 on the 15th; the G Company row shows the hill lost and retaken from 2200 on the 14th to 1630 on the 15th; the supply and relief row shows the refused withdrawal on the 13th, the airdrops on the 14th, and the relief leaving at 1545 and arriving at about 1700 on the 15th — Figure 2. Chipyong-ni timeline. Numbers refer to the list below the chart — our own drawing, based on sources 1 and 2

Decision Point Analysis

Matrix of four decision points with the options open and the choice made. DP 1, regimental commander: a tight low perimeter with a central reserve. DP 2, Eighth Army commander: order a stand and prepare a relief. DP 3, CPV command: night attacks from several sides. DP 4, regimental commander: commit the reserve with air, artillery and tanks — Figure 3. Decision points: options and choices. The orange border marks the course actually taken. DP 3 is inferred from Chinese actions, as CPV records were not consulted — our own drawing, based on sources 1–3

DP 1: siting the perimeter (regimental commander, from 3 February) — scenario phase 1 Of (a) holding the outer hills, (b) a tight perimeter on the low inner ground with a central reserve, (c) a tight ring plus outposts on the outer hills, or (d) holding lightly and preparing to withdraw, he chose (b). Spreading four battalions over 19 km of ridgeline would have thinned the line and used up the reserve. Inside a small ring, artillery, tanks and the anti-aircraft vehicles could support every sector. The price was giving up the high ground, and G Company's hill on the south rim became the weakest point.

DP 2: the order to stand (Eighth Army commander, 13 February) Of (a) approving the withdrawal to Yoju, (b) ordering a stand and preparing a relief, or (c) standing on airdrops alone, he chose (b). Giving up the salient would have opened the flanks of neighbouring units, and a dug-in regiment could hold Chinese forces in place — that appears to have been the reasoning. The regiment matched it by requesting airdrops and air support and keeping its reserve intact (scenario phase 2).

DP 3: how to attack (CPV command, 13–15 February) CPV records were not consulted, so this is inferred from what the Chinese did. They could (a) encircle the town and wait, (b) attack at night from several sides, or (c) bypass it and push south. They chose (b) and attacked for two nights. But the attacks on different sectors came at different times, and the Chinese memoir claims some of the regiments ordered in lost their way (source 5). That gave the regiment room to move ammunition and reserves to the most threatened sector.

DP 4: retaking G Company's hill (regimental commander, dawn, 15 February) — scenario phases 6–7 The dawn counterattack had failed, and unlike before, the Chinese did not pull back at daylight. Of (a) counterattacking again at once with whatever was at hand, (b) committing the reserve with air, artillery and tanks, (c) pulling back to an inner line, or (d) waiting for the relief, he chose (b). He held the reserve until daylight, when air support could be used, and then committed it in one blow. The hill was retaken at about 1630. Around the same time four regimental tanks went out south of the perimeter and struck the Chinese flank and rear, and the relief column came in along that road.

Lessons

All-round defence and the size of the position: a position must fit the force as well as the ground. The tight ring gave up observation in exchange for concentrated fire and a reserve (FM 3-90, source 7).
Use of the reserve: through both nights the regimental reserve stayed back while battalions sealed penetrations with their own troops. It went in only once the decisive place was clear.
Combined arms and air power: anti-aircraft guns firing on ground targets, flares at night, close air support and airdrops kept the regiment going.
Mission command and higher intent: the order to stand came with a promise of relief, which gave the regiment a reason to hold. Command did not lapse after the regimental commander was wounded (ADP 6-0, source 6).
The cost of the relief: Task Force Crombez carried infantry on its tanks through enemy-held ground. Of the 160 riders, 23 entered Chipyong-ni with the column (source 2). That was the price of speed.

Unresolved Questions

Chinese strength: eight regiments (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture) against three that actually attacked (Chinese memoir) is a wide gap.
Losses: a US estimate (about 2,000 Chinese dead and 3,000 wounded) and the Chinese memoir (just over 900) differ sharply. UN losses (51 dead, 250 wounded, 42 missing) come second-hand from a 1990 staff ride packet that we did not see.
Dates and times: accounts give the battle as 13–14, 13–15 or 13–19 February, and the relief's arrival as 1700 or 1725.

You can command this battle yourself in the training scenario "Chipyong-ni", as commander of the 23rd RCT. Decide where to draw the line and when to commit the reserve under the same conditions.

Sources

US Army Center of Military History (CMH), Combat Actions in Korea, ch. 8, "Chipyong-ni" (public transcription). https://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/CombatActions/Chipyong-ni.htm (accessed 2026-10-13)
US Army Center of Military History (CMH), Combat Actions in Korea, ch. 9, "Task Force Crombez" (public transcription). https://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/CombatActions/TFCrombez.htm (accessed 2026-10-13)
Academy of Korean Studies, Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, "Jipyeong-ri jeontu" (Battle of Chipyong-ni, in Korean; revised 2013 by the MND Institute for Military History). https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0054443 (accessed 2026-10-13)
US Army Center of Military History (CMH), Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, ch. 15 (returned 403, not read). https://history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-3/CMH_Pub_20-3.pdf (access attempted 2026-10-13)
Wikipedia, "Battle of Chipyong-ni" (cross-check only; strength, losses and Chinese memoir quoted second-hand). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chipyong-ni (accessed 2026-10-13)
US Army, ADP 6-0 Mission Command. https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/ADP.aspx (accessed 2026-10-13)
US Army, FM 3-90 Tactics (defensive operations). https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/FM.aspx (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the CMH map of Chipyong-ni (public domain). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_Chipyong-ni.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the M16 half-track photograph (public domain). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M16-halftrack-korea.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)