In depth | Novodarivka and Rivnopil — how the same units changed their method of attack in two weeks

2026-10-01 · 2023-06-04 – 2023-06-26

Overview

Part 1: Novodarivka and Rivnopil (June 2023) set two ways of breaching side by side; this piece looks at the small decisions between them. Before dawn on 4 June 2023 a Ukrainian mechanised brigade opened two lanes with UR-77s and tried to drive into Novodarivka, but the columns of two companies stopped one after the other [1]. In mid-June a Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) assault unit with two borrowed tanks and one battery took the Russian company position before Rivnopil at light cost [1]. The same units, facing the same enemy, changed method within two weeks. Below, the ground is re-read with weather and elevation data, and phases p1–p8 are taken in turn.

A desert-coloured MRAP seen from a front quarter, with a machine gun on its roof turret and a soldier leaning out of the hatch — Photo 1. A Ukrainian MaxxPro MRAP in training (November 2022), the vehicle the infantry rode toward Novodarivka on 4 June; not a photo of the site — Photo: ArmyInform (Ukrainian MoD news agency), CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Strategic and operational context

RUSI reports that the last two axes considered for the 2023 southern offensive were Orikhiv–Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka–Berdiansk. Russian density was similar on both, but the second meant a much longer advance, so Orikhiv became the main effort [2]. Novodarivka and Rivnopil lie about 17 km south-west of Velyka Novosilka, on the Zaporizhzhia–Donetsk boundary [17]. The sector fixed Russian reserves and threatened Pryiutne and the Surovikin line beyond [1][9].

The front had barely moved for months; Russia's early-2023 attacks fell 40–50 km east [1]. A TDF brigade held the tree line around Novopil, about 1 km north of Novodarivka, reinforced in May by a mechanised brigade and another line brigade. The intent: break the initial Russian positions at both villages and build a foothold toward Pryiutne, about 6 km south [1].

Gains were small: 113 km² across the south in two weeks [6], slowed, the Ukrainian president told the BBC, by wide minefields [7]. UK Defence Intelligence later assessed at least 125 km² retaken on this axis over the summer [11].

Terrain and weather in detail (OAKOC)

Detailed map: Novopil and the friendly tree line to the north, the minefield and two UR-77 lanes with stopped vehicles, Russian tanks from the south-east and west, the SPG-9 on the flank, two assault groups, the eastern farm and western height, the Russian company between the villages, the fix, feint and western infiltration before Rivnopil, the adjacent brigade's attack, and the flooded balka ponds and anti-tank screen to the south — Figure 1. The Novodarivka–Rivnopil breakthrough in detail (sketch; estimated). Village outlines, streams and ponds from OSM [17][18]; unit positions and sizes estimated from RUSI [1], to 26 June only — Own work

Observation. Open-Meteo's 90 m grid puts the tree line south of Novopil at about 170 m, the stream bed at 159 m, Novodarivka at 155–165 m and the ridge between the villages at 167–170 m [16]. The long, narrow village let the Russian company overlook approaches from east and west [1]. On 4 June the sun rose at 04:37 and set at 20:26 [14], leaving short nights.

Avenues of approach. Novopil's southern edge is about 1.7 km from Novodarivka's northern edge [17]; where positions were this close, the minefield was thinnest [1]. Rivnopil is about 4.7 km east of Novodarivka [17]. The company position before Rivnopil controlled a north–south woodblock; bypassing it would let anti-tank teams come round the flank along the trees [1].

Key terrain. Inside the village, the crossroads and the eastern farm; outside, a western height used by a Russian artillery observer [1]. The 90 m grid shows no clear height there (155–161 m) [16], so Figure 1 marks it as estimated.

Obstacles. Russian doctrine set minefields 120 m deep [1]. ERA5 gives 29.6 mm of rain on 29–31 May and almost none on 1–10 June; topsoil moisture fell from 0.414 m³/m³ on 31 May to 0.315 on 4 June and 0.21 on 10 June [14][15]. The ground was drying but still wet, and the lanes had to drop into a stream bed along the village's northern edge [18] — probably why the command group argued over soft ground (est.). South of Rivnopil a chain of ponds dammed along a balka [18] likely matches the "agricultural dams" blown in late June [1].

Cover and concealment. Tree lines and woodblocks were the only concealment. June foliage hid the western assault group from drones [1], and could equally blind the Ukrainian command post's drone feeds.

Organisation and command relationships

Unit names below brigade and company counts were not published; "est." rests on RUSI and the scenario.

Side	Echelon	Unit / element	Role and equipment	Source
Ukraine	Brigade	Zaporizhzhia TDF brigade	Held the tree line; announced liberation for 4 June	[1][3][4]
Ukraine	Brigade	Mechanised brigade (name not published)	Spearhead of the breach	[1]
Ukraine	Brigade	Another line brigade; adjacent brigade	Attack on Rivnopil (adjacent brigade)	[1]
Ukraine	Company	Lead company	MaxxPro MRAPs led by two tanks	[1]
Ukraine	Company	Follow-on company	Western lane; every vehicle stopped by mines	[1]
Ukraine	Engineers	Two UR-77s	Cut two 6 m lanes	[1]
Ukraine	Team	SPG-9 recoilless rifle team	Engaged Russian tanks from the flank	[1]
Ukraine	Platoon	Two assault groups (platoon size)	One along the wrecks, one through western dead ground	[1]
Ukraine	Fires	M777 batteries (north-west)	Preparation, counterbattery advantage	[1]
Ukraine	Drones	Converted agricultural drones	Night RPG drops on reserves	[1]
Ukraine	TDF assault unit	Two or more platoon-size groups, 2 borrowed tanks, 1 battery	Attack on the position before Rivnopil	[1]
Ukraine	Engineers	One obstacle-crossing vehicle	Advance halted at the waterway	[1]
Russia	Army	58th CAA (RUSI); UK cites parts of the 36th and 5th Armies	Defence of the sector	[1][11]
Russia	Company	One each at Novodarivka, Rivnopil and between them	Initial combat positions	[1]
Russia	Reserve	Including armour (a tank company in a woodblock)	Counterattack, flanking fire	[1]
Russia	Tanks	2 + 2	Flanking fire on the columns (positions est.)	[1]
Russia	Observation	Artillery observer	Western height	[1]
Russia	Anti-tank	About 4 launchers and 50 missiles per tree line	Screen beyond the waterway, late June	[1]

RUSI notes that a shortage of junior leaders pushed battle management to higher echelons, limiting mission command; each battalion had about two platoons rated able to lead an assault [1]. Yet platoon-size groups turned the fight.

Day-by-day account

Late May – 3 June: preparation

M777 batteries in the north-west fired the preparation; Russian guns had pulled back and shells arrived as requested [1]. Drones dropped RPGs by night; once, five drones destroyed or badly damaged seven tanks of the woodblock tank company, and all five were lost [1]. On 3 June the command group argued over the soft ground but decided to attack where positions were close and mines thinner [1].

4 June: two lanes, two columns

Before dawn two UR-77s cut 6 m lanes across the narrowest stretch. A MaxxPro column led by two tanks entered the eastern lane; several MRAPs bogged in the tank ruts and those behind could not turn. Once the column was in, two Russian tanks appeared. Ukrainian tanks replied at about 800 m, but the vehicles stopped one after another. Some squads reached the village edge, and casualties could be moved only after an SPG-9 disabled the Russian tanks from the flank [1].

By day the follow-on company took the firmer western lane. Again, once it was fully in, two Russian tanks closed fast. The command post saw them on drone video and called artillery; the company sped up, strayed off route and every vehicle stopped on mines. The dismounts split between the outskirts and the line of departure [1].

4–5 June: widening the foothold

The Russians fell back to the eastern farm and the central road. Needing room to disperse, the commander sent two assault groups: one along the lane using wrecks as cover, one through western dead ground opened by the Russian redeployment to the crossroads. The Russians withdrew east to avoid being cut off [1]. The TDF brigade later named this the day of liberation [3][5].

5–19 June: the village, the height and the announcements

Fighting went on for a week. The eastern farm held but no longer overlooked other approaches, and the western height was taken first [1]. On 11 June a Tavria group spokesman claimed a dam near Novodarivka had been blown, flooding the Mokri Yaly [4][5]. The TDF brigade announced liberation on 12 June, before the ministry confirmed it [3], and the deputy defence minister listed the village on 19 June [6].

Mid-June: the position before Rivnopil

After a preparation, two borrowed tanks fired from cover and laid smoke to suggest approaching infantry. A platoon in the eastern tree line advanced in pairs, firing; a heavy salvo then "announced" a flank assault. As the Russians shifted east, a platoon infiltrating along the western flank reached the thinned position. The defenders left their radios and fell back to Rivnopil; five were taken prisoner. Russian artillery had the position registered, so the attackers pushed beyond it quickly [1].

Late June: Rivnopil

The adjacent brigade attacked Rivnopil over several days [1]. On 26 June the deputy defence minister announced its recapture [8], and ISW confirmed it from geolocated footage [10]. Russian forces withdrew beyond a waterway, blew agricultural dams and set anti-tank positions in each tree line; with one obstacle-crossing vehicle, the Ukrainians consolidated [1]. More than 32 mm of rain fell on 24–26 June [14].

Decision points in depth

The headings follow the training scenario; p2x and p7x are what-if phases (Figure 2).

Daily rain bars and a topsoil moisture line from 28 May to 26 June 2023, with phase bands and decision points p1 to p8 plus what-if phases p2x and p7x — Figure 2. Decision points and the state of the ground. Rain and topsoil moisture from ERA5 reanalysis [14][15]; decision times follow the training scenario — Own work

p1 Breach or not? (3 June, evening)

Knew: artillery superiority; a Russian armoured reserve of unknown size, one tank company weakened by drones; wet ground. Options: mounted breach through two UR-77 lanes, night infiltration on foot, delaying H-hour, or a feint here with the main effort elsewhere. Decision: the mounted breach; the lanes opened, the columns stopped [1]. Otherwise: moisture was falling only 0.01–0.02 a day [15] while the artillery advantage would last only until Russian guns returned. A covert breach on foot needed darkness, and nights were barely seven hours [14]. A feint would have given up the thinnest minefield.

p2 A column inside the lane (4 June, before dawn)

Knew: lead MRAPs bogged, the lane blocked, two Russian tanks firing at 800 m, the SPG-9 team waiting. Options: keep firing and send the SPG-9 to the flank, back out, smoke, or dismount. Decision: the tanks replied, the column stopped, the SPG-9 finally settled it [1]. Otherwise: reversing in a 6 m lane pushes vehicles into mines, as happened repeatedly near Orikhiv [2]; smoke would have helped, but only 3% of fire missions were smoke [1].

p2x Infantry pinned in the minefield (what-if, 4 June morning)

Situation: stopped vehicles block the lane; dismounts lie in the minefield; one platoon may hold the village edge. Recommended: remove the tank threat with the SPG-9, then evacuate while the platoon holds. In reality evacuation followed exactly that order [1]; towing or a general advance would expose more troops to fire and unseen mines.

p3 An isolated platoon (4 June, morning)

Knew: one platoon at the village edge with fire-swept ground behind; engineers said the western lane looked firmer. Options: commit the follow-on company mounted via the western lane, cover the platoon and reinforce at night, or reinforce on foot. Decision: the western lane, serving both progress and the platoon [1]. Otherwise: dusk came at 20:26 [14], too late to count on; foot reinforcement was slower, but foot assault groups eventually turned the fight (p5).

p4 The second column (4 June, daytime)

Knew: drone video showed two Russian tanks closing as the column committed. Options: call artillery and keep moving, halt and engage, dismount, or withdraw. Decision: artillery; the company sped up, strayed and stopped on mines [1]. Otherwise: both times the tanks came after the column was fully in [1]: the defender's method, not chance. RUSI describes Russian armour flanking vehicles caught in mines, often losing the tanks but doing heavy damage [1]. Halting would make a stationary artillery target. The missing step was securing the lane's far end — the "secure" in SOSRA.

p5 Widening the foothold (4–5 June)

Knew: troops crowded in a small foothold under fire; Russians falling back; the western platoon had found a way in. Options: two assault groups, dig in, a frontal attack down the central road, or fire alone. Decision: two groups; the western one, hidden by foliage, took the crossroads and the Russians withdrew [1]. Otherwise: digging in keeps a crowded force under fire, and the central road led into fresh positions. The dead ground was unplanned; the platoon on the spot read it.

p6 The farm or the height? (5–11 June)

Knew: the farm held out but overlooked little; the observer on the western height kept calling fire. Options: contain the farm and take the height, clear the farm, rest, or reconnoitre toward Rivnopil. Decision: the height first; the farm held until the Rivnopil attack isolated it [1]. Otherwise: clearing the farm spends troops on a reduced threat while the observer keeps shelling resting units.

p7 The company position before Rivnopil (mid-June)

Knew: a bypass invited flanking anti-tank teams; available were the TDF unit, two borrowed tanks and one battery; Novodarivka had cost "two companies' worth" of equipment, a rate that could not reach the Surovikin line [1]. Options: fix, feint and infiltrate; a mounted breach; bypass and screen; or wait for engineers. Decision: fix, deceive and infiltrate; the Russians emptied the west and withdrew at light cost to the attackers [1]. Otherwise: a mounted breach staked the last two tanks; waiting let the defence harden. It inverted Novodarivka: show the enemy what he expects, then strike elsewhere.

p7x If the deception had been read (what-if, mid-June)

Situation: the attack stalls at the tree line; anti-tank teams move in the woodblock. Recommended: pull back and apply the same principle at dusk. FM 3-90 notes one feint may fail and repeated feints may be needed [13]. In reality the deception worked [1].

p8 Registered trenches (mid to late June)

Knew: the position had fallen, its coordinates registered by Russian guns; the adjacent brigade was preparing for Rivnopil, behind which lay a waterway. Options: push beyond quickly, occupy the trenches, pursue to Rivnopil, or withdraw. Decision: push beyond; Rivnopil fell to the adjacent brigade [1][8][10]. Otherwise: occupation meant sitting under registered fire, pursuit exceeded the unit's size. RUSI adds that Russia later replaced registered fire with charges pre-placed in positions [1].

A Ukrainian soldier kneeling beside an SPG-9 recoilless rifle on a tripod among dense green bushes — Photo 2. A Ukrainian SPG-9 recoilless rifle (August 2024, Chasiv Yar area), the weapon that stopped the Russian tanks on 4 June; not a photo of Novodarivka — Photo: 24th Mechanised Brigade, Armed Forces of Ukraine, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Doctrine re-read

Penetration (FM 3-90, paras 2-36, 2-37). A penetration masses overwhelming power on a narrow front while fixing enemy reserves and long-range weapons [13]. The narrow front was right; fixing the armoured reserve was left to drones, and it appeared both times.

Breaching (ch. 18, paras 18-21 to 18-23). SOSRA — suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault [13]. On 4 June there was suppression and reduction, but no obscuration and no force securing the far end. RUSI found the same on the Orikhiv axis: shallow lanes, crews straying, ploughs only on lead vehicles [2]. The covert breach of para 18-21 is the scenario's night option at p1.

Infiltration (paras 2-82, 2-83). Moving undetected through enemy areas, rarely decisive alone, used with other manoeuvre to attack from an unexpected direction [13] — the western platoon's role before Rivnopil, alongside a fix and a feint.

Feint (ch. 19, paras 19-37, 19-38, 19-43). Deception through real contact, with limited objectives, to draw the enemy or his fires away from the main effort [13]. The eastern platoon fired and advanced, backed by a salvo, and the Russians moved [1].

The Russian side. Russian manuals were not checked; RUSI's observations stand in. The first belt worked as a disruption zone [2]; fire was pre-registered on lost positions and armour flanked attackers caught in mines [1]. After early June minefields deepened from 120 m to as much as 500 m, with anti-tank mines stacked in pairs [1].

Animated map showing the phases in turn — preparation and lanes, both columns stopping, the assault groups and the crossroads, the western height, the fix, feint and infiltration before Rivnopil, and the Russian withdrawal beyond the waterway; the still frame shows 26 June — Figure 3. Novodarivka–Rivnopil manoeuvre by phase (18-second loop; reduced motion shows only the final situation). Positions sketched and estimated — Own work

Source criticism

When was Novodarivka liberated? The TDF brigade said 4 June, posting on 12 June before ministry confirmation [3][4][5]; RUSI describes a further week of fighting [1]; the ministry listed it on 19 June [6]. 4 June is the foothold, the whole village about ten days later. RUSI, drawing on participants, captured documents and unpublished footage [1], is the better guide to sequence.

Rate of advance. RUSI's body gives 700–1,200 m per three days of fighting, its summary per five days [1]. The first seems to describe this case, the second the whole offensive.

Which Russian army? RUSI says the 58th, from captured maps [1]; UK Defence Intelligence cites the 36th and 5th [11]. The village sits near a district boundary, so both may hold; RUSI is more specific at company level.

Where did the dam break? The 11 June claim named the Mokri Yaly [4][5], which on OSM lies more than 10 km east [18]; RUSI's demolitions came in late June behind Rivnopil [1]. Separate events or a loose place name — the sources cannot say.

Losses. RUSI gives only "two companies' worth of equipment" and light losses at Rivnopil, and notes vehicles were more often immobilised than destroyed [1]; the figure includes recoverable vehicles.

Area. 113 km² for the south on 19 June [6], 130 km² on 26 June [8], at least 125 km² on this axis over the summer [11]: different scopes, not directly comparable.

Lessons

Lanes fail by blockage, not width. Plan recovery and a far-end security force for every lane.
The hidden reserve arrives after the column is in. Find and fix it before the second commitment.
Smoke is traded against the command post's eyes, and at Rivnopil smoke was the deception.
Platoons turn the fight. At about two per battalion, skilled assault platoons must be spent carefully.
Reuse the principle, not the method. Fix, deceive and infiltrate can be tried again.
Do not linger in registered trenches. Move through.

Unresolved questions

Brigade names, company counts and dispositions.
Vehicle numbers and times for each column on 4 June.
The direction of the second Russian tank pair and the exact western height.
The date of the attack before Rivnopil and the TDF unit's size.
Whether the two dam reports describe one event.
Personnel losses on both sides were not disclosed.

Sources

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