Novodarivka and Rivnopil (June 2023): Two Ways to Break In, One Fortnight

2026-10-13 · 2023-06-04 – 2023-06-26

Overview (BLUF)

Early on 4 June 2023 a Ukrainian mechanised brigade began a mounted breach toward Novodarivka, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts. UR-77 mine-clearing charges opened two lanes, but boggy ground, narrow lanes and hidden Russian tanks stopped the vehicle columns of two companies in turn. Dismounted assault groups eventually widened the foothold. In mid-June a Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) assault force took the Russian company position in front of Rivnopil at little cost by combining a frontal fix, a feint on one flank and infiltration on the other. ISW confirmed from footage that Rivnopil had been taken as of 26 June.

RUSI's case study "Stormbreak" (September 2023) found that the first breach cost "two companies worth of equipment" while losses in the Rivnopil attack were light. Taking the two villages took two weeks, at one tactical advance per three days of fighting, each moving the line about 700–1,200 m. Same force, same enemy, same fortnight: only the method differed, and the price differed sharply. That is the core of this case.

A UR-77 mine-clearing vehicle on a Russian engineer training ground: a large launch ramp for mine-clearing line charges is raised at an angle at the rear of the tracked hull, with snow on the ground — Photo 1. UR-77 mine-clearing line charge vehicle (Russian engineer training, January 2020). On 4 June Ukrainian forces used two vehicles of this type to cut two 6 m lanes through the minefield — Photo: Russian Ministry of Defence (Mil.ru), CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Background and Strategic Context

Ukraine's 2023 southern offensive opened in early June. The Novodarivka–Rivnopil area lies east of the main Orikhiv axis, on the oblast border south-west of Velyka Novosilka. The front here had barely moved for months before the offensive. Ukrainian troops held tree lines around Novopil, about 1 km north of Novodarivka. The TDF brigade that had long held this line was reinforced in May by a mechanised brigade and another line brigade, and the mechanised brigade was to spearhead the breakthrough (RUSI).

To advance toward the main Russian defensive line, the so-called Surovikin Line, Ukrainian forces had to get through Priyutne, about 6 km to the south. These two villages were the first gate. RUSI chose this fortnight as a representative case precisely because aggregate losses and plans for the whole offensive were too sensitive to publish.

Terrain and Weather

The fields between the villages were open and heavily mined. It had rained in early June and the ground was boggy; the command group debated this the evening before the attack. Novodarivka is a long, thin, ruined village running east–west that overlooks the approaches on both sides. Russian artillery spotters sat on the high ground west of the village. The Russian company position in front of Rivnopil controlled access to a chain of woodblocks running north–south, so bypassing it risked ATGM fire into the flank. A water obstacle lay behind Rivnopil (Figure 1).

Forces and Dispositions

Ukraine: A mechanised brigade (infantry in MaxxPro MRAPs, tanks, UR-77 engineers), the TDF brigade and another line brigade. M777 batteries firing from the north-west had pushed Russian artillery back with preparatory fire since late May, and for the first time in months ammunition arrived promptly when requested. At night converted agricultural drones struck Russian reserves, but could not operate when Russian electronic warfare was active (RUSI).
Russia: Under the 58th Combined Arms Army: one company in Novodarivka, one in Rivnopil and a third in positions between them, with reserves including armour behind (RUSI, based on a captured map).

Course of the Action

Schematic map of Novodarivka and Rivnopil: the two breach lanes from the Novopil tree line in the north through the minefield and the stalled columns, fire from hidden Russian tanks, dismounted assault groups using the wrecks and dead ground in the west, Russian troops falling back to the eastern farmstead, the eastern feint and western infiltration against the company position in front of Rivnopil, the neighbouring brigade's attack on Rivnopil, the Russian withdrawal behind the flooded water obstacle with an ATGM screen, and the direction of Priyutne to the south — Figure 1. Schematic of Novodarivka and Rivnopil (4–26 Jun 2023). Positions, boundaries and scale are approximate and do not show the current situation — own work, based on the scenario map and RUSI's Stormbreak (source 1)

Mounted breach (early 4 June): Two UR-77s cut two 6 m lanes at the thinnest part of the minefield. A column of MRAPs led by two tanks entered the eastern lane under covering artillery fire, but hidden Russian tanks engaged it at about 800 m and the vehicles were stopped one after another. Some sections reached the edge of the village; troops caught in the minefield could only be extracted after SPG-9 recoilless gun teams on the flank knocked out the Russian tanks.
Second column (4 June, daytime): The follow-on company went down the western lane, where the ground was firmer. When two more Russian tanks appeared, the column sped up, left the lane, and every vehicle in the company was stopped by mines.
Widening the foothold, fighting in the village (about 4–11 June): Two platoon-sized assault groups went in, one along the lane using the stalled vehicles as cover, the other through dead ground on the west that Russian repositioning had opened, to attack the crossroads. Russian troops fell back to a farm in the east and positions along the central road. Fighting in the village continued for another week; the next objective was the observation post on the western high ground. The TDF brigade claimed liberation on 4 June, but ISW found no footage supporting it that day.
Rivnopil (mid-June – 26 June): Once the TDF assault force took the company position in front of Rivnopil, Russian forces had to redistribute troops in the village. A neighbouring brigade attacked over several days, and Russian troops withdrew behind the water obstacle, blowing agricultural dams to flood the area. They set up an ATGM screen of about four launchers and 50 missiles per tree line (RUSI).

Timeline in four-day steps from 3 to 27 June 2023: mounted breach 4 June, fighting in the village and western high ground about 5–11 June, the position in front of Rivnopil mid-June (approximate), Rivnopil secured late June. Below: evening of 3 June attack decision; 4 June lanes cut and columns stopped; 4 June ISW finds no visual evidence; 12 June Novodarivka liberation officially announced; 26 June ISW confirms Rivnopil taken — Figure 2. Timeline for Novodarivka and Rivnopil. The exact date of the attack on the position in front of Rivnopil is not public, so a range is shown. Colour shows the nature of the information (blue: Ukrainian statements and actions, orange: independent ISW confirmation) — own work, based on sources 1–4

Decision Point Analysis

Table of the options considered and the choice made at four decision points. Decision 1: mounted breach with UR-77 lanes and a tank-led MRAP column; decision 2: commit the follow-on company down the western lane, then two dismounted assault groups; decision 3: frontal fix, eastern feint, western infiltration; decision 4: withdraw behind the water obstacle, flood it and set an ATGM screen — Figure 3. Options and choices at each decision point. Orange borders mark the option actually taken. Decisions 1–3 follow the scenario decisions; the other options in decision 4 are not in public sources and are marked as inferred — own work, based on the analysis above and source 1

Decision 1: Breach now, mounted? (mechanised brigade command group, evening of 3 June) This is scenario decision 1. The options were (a) open UR-77 lanes at the narrowest point and breach mounted with a tank-led MRAP column, (b) secure the village edge first by dismounted infiltration, (c) wait for the ground to dry, or (d) feint at Novodarivka and put the main effort elsewhere. Option (a) was chosen. Artillery superiority had been achieved, the lines were close together, and the thinnest part of the minefield lay directly ahead. The result: the lanes were cut and the columns stopped. On boggy ground in a 6 m lane, once the lead vehicle halted there was no way round for those behind.

Decision 2: How to save the isolated platoon (same command group, morning of 4 June) These are scenario decisions 3 and 5. The options were (a) withdraw the platoon, (b) commit the follow-on company mounted down the western lane, (c) reinforce on foot using the wrecks as cover, or (d) hold with fires alone. In practice (b) came first, and the second column also stopped. Then two dismounted assault groups, in effect option (c), widened the foothold. The first decision's logic was simply carried forward; what changed the situation was not vehicles but a platoon that read the dead ground.

Decision 3: How to take the position in front of Rivnopil (TDF assault force, mid-June) This is scenario decision 7. The judgement was that repeating Novodarivka's losses would leave nothing to reach the Surovikin Line with. The force had only two tanks borrowed from a neighbouring brigade and one artillery battery. The options were (a) repeat a mounted breach, (b) bypass and screen, (c) fix the front, feint on one flank and infiltrate on the other, or (d) wait for equipment. Option (c) was chosen. The tanks fired from cover and back, with smoke laid in front of them to suggest infantry advancing. An eastern platoon moved forward in pairs under suppressing fire, and a heavy artillery salvo "signposted" an eastern assault. When Russian troops shifted east, a platoon infiltrating from the west hit the thinned position. The Russians abandoned their communications equipment and withdrew. Because the position was pre-registered by Russian artillery, the attackers had to push on past it quickly.

Decision 4: How to hold behind the broken first position (Russian 58th Combined Arms Army, late June) Russian forces did not hold Rivnopil to the last but withdrew behind the water obstacle, blew dams to flood the area and set up an ATGM screen. With only one obstacle-crossing vehicle, Ukrainian units had to stop and consolidate. According to RUSI, the Russian side broadly saw these engagements as successes because they had worn down the equipment of Ukrainian manoeuvre units. Afterwards Russia deepened its minefields from the doctrinal 120 m to as much as 500 m.

Lessons

Combined arms and breaching: A charge-cleared lane does not complete a breach. Lane width, ground conditions, direct fire to deal with hidden tanks and smoke all have to come together. RUSI noted that only 3% of Ukrainian artillery missions were smoke.
Surprise and deception: The Rivnopil attack showed the enemy what it expected and struck elsewhere. Two borrowed tanks and one battery were enough to break a company position.
Mission command: The western dead ground was not in the plan. A platoon read the opportunity created by the enemy's repositioning and took it.
Drones and electronic warfare: The command post saw the Russian tanks appear on drone feeds, and night drone strikes worked only while Russian electronic warfare was switched off.
Sustainment: Equipment loss rates set how far an advance can go. A single obstacle-crossing vehicle bound the tempo of the whole effort.

Unresolved Questions

When Novodarivka was taken: the TDF brigade claimed 4 June and the official announcement came around the 12th. ISW saw no footage on the 4th, and RUSI writes that the eastern farmstead held out after that.
The exact date and units for the attack on the position in front of Rivnopil are not public.
RUSI gives the rate of advance as one per three days in the body and every five days in its summary.
The RUSI report was reviewed by the Ukrainian armed forces before publication and deliberately omits personnel losses.

To make the assault commander's decisions yourself, open the Novodarivka Breach scenario.

Sources

RUSI Special Report, "Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine's 2023 Offensive" (2023-09-04), pp. 1–22. https://static.rusi.org/Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf (accessed 2026-10-13)
ISW, "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2023" (on Critical Threats; not directly accessible, checked via listing and quotation). https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2023 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Rubryka, report on the TDF brigade's announcement of Novodarivka's liberation (2023-06-12). https://rubryka.com/en/2023/06/12/zsu-zvilnyly-vid-rosiyan-novodarivku/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 26 June assessment (Rivnopil confirmed taken) (2023-06-27). https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/06/27/ukraine-advanced-on-at-least-two-sectors-of-the-front-on-june-26-isw (accessed 2026-10-13)
RUSI Special Report, "Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine's Offensive Operations, 2022–23" (2024-07-18), pp. 15–19 (cross-check on the opening of the offensive and Russian dispositions). https://static.rusi.org/lessons-learned-ukraine-offensive-2022-23.pdf (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the UR-77 mine-clearing vehicle photo (CC BY 4.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:EngineerExercise2020-19.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)