Hostomel Airport (February 2022): The Airfield That Never Became an Air Bridge

2026-10-13 · 2022-02-24 – 2022-02-25

Overview (BLUF)

On the morning of 24 February 2022, a Russian airborne (VDV) air assault force of about 34 helicopters flew from Belarus low along the Dnipro. Its objective was Hostomel (Antonov) airport, about 20 km north-west of central Kyiv. The airfield was held by about 200 Ukrainian National Guard soldiers, mostly new conscripts and rear-echelon troops. They brought down several helicopters but could not stop the landing, and around 1300, with ammunition running out, they withdrew.

Russia's plan was to secure the airfield and then fly in about 1,000 airborne troops by Il-76 to open Kyiv's western flank. The follow-on transport wave turned back in mid-air, and the VDV on the airfield were shelled all afternoon and pushed off at dusk by a counterattack. Overnight Ukrainian forces cratered the runway and pulled back. Russian ground forces retook the airport on the morning of 25 February, but the runway could no longer take heavy transports.

The case shows how vulnerable an air assault on a fixed point is when the ground linkup is late, and what the time bought by a small defending force can change.

Oblique aerial photograph of Hostomel airport: a long runway runs diagonally across fields, with aprons, hangars and buildings clustered at the lower right — Photo 1. Hostomel (Antonov) airport from the air, before the war (taken around 2007). The runway is about 3.5 km long — Photo: Oleksiynaumov, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Background and Strategic Context

Before dawn on 24 February, on the Kyiv axis, Russian mechanized forces crossed the Belarusian border at about 0400 and drove south along the Chornobyl–Ivankiv corridor. By road the border is about 127 km from Kyiv. The Hostomel assault is assessed as the first step of an operation to seize an airfield before these ground forces arrived and keep flying troops in.

According to RUSI, Russian missile strikes at the start of the war destroyed two air-defence sites screening the Dnipro from the north, opening the gap that made the helicopter assault from Belarus possible. The National Guard rapid reaction brigade responsible for the airfield, meanwhile, had sent its main body east. What remained had small arms, older Igla MANPADS and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns.

Terrain and Weather

The airport sits on flat fields west of the Kyiv Reservoir (Figure 1). The runway runs about 3.5 km from north-north-west to south-south-east, with aprons, hangars and the cantonment to the south-east. On such open ground the landing force also had little cover. There are woods to the west of the airfield.

The helicopters flew low over the reservoir to stay under radar coverage. The Chornobyl–Ivankiv corridor is a narrow road between forest and marsh, which slowed the mechanized forces.

Forces and Dispositions

Ukraine (defence): about 200 soldiers left behind by the National Guard rapid reaction brigade. About 20 held the northern radar post with a ZU-23-2; the rest were around the cantonment south-east of the runway. Trucks parked on the runway blocked fixed-wing landings.
Ukraine (counterattack): War on the Rocks (WOTR) lists two air assault brigades (flown in from the Zhytomyr direction), a mechanized brigade (from Bila Tserkva), a Special Operations Forces regiment and volunteers, supported by artillery and Su-24 bombers. The Modern War Institute (MWI) says the defending brigade itself counterattacked.
Russia: 200–300 VDV troops of the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade and 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, carried by about 34 Mi-8 transport and Ka-52/Mi-24 attack helicopters. A follow-on wave of 18 Il-76s with about 1,000 airborne troops stood by. The landing force had no tanks or artillery.

Course of the Action

Schematic of the Hostomel air assault: the helicopter route south from Belarus along the Kyiv Reservoir, turning west near the Vyshhorod dam to the airport; the Russian mechanized column moving south through Ivankiv; and Ukrainian counterattack approaches from the Zhytomyr direction in the west and from Bila Tserkva in the south — Figure 1. Schematic of the Hostomel air assault (24–25 Feb 2022). Positions, routes and rivers are approximate and do not show the current situation — own work, based on sources 1–3

Preliminary strikes and approach (24 February, 0600–1000): At about 0600–0700 two cruise missiles struck the airport but missed. The helicopter formation entered Ukrainian airspace at about 0930 and followed the reservoir south. At about 1030, near the Kyiv hydroelectric dam, the two lead helicopters were reportedly shot down.
Landing and defence (1100–1300): While attack helicopters strafed the positions, transport helicopters put troops down in two waves of 10. The defenders brought down a Ka-52 with an Igla at close range, and its wreck blocked the runway. They are also claimed to have brought down two more Ka-52s and a Mi-8 over two hours. With ammunition running out, the defenders withdrew down a narrow street; the roughly 20 soldiers at the northern radar post were surrounded and captured.
Russian control and Ukrainian shelling (1300–1700): The VDV held the airfield by about 1300 and set up blocking positions around it by about 1600. Around this time the follow-on Il-76 wave turned back in mid-air. The VDV on the airfield came under heavy Ukrainian artillery fire.
Counterattack and cratering (1730 to the morning of 25 February): Near sunset, after artillery and Su-24 strikes, the ground counterattack began. The poorly positioned VDV were dislodged, and the survivors withdrew into the woods to the west by about 2200. As a Russian mechanized column approached from the north, Ukrainian forces cratered the runway with artillery and air strikes and pulled back. Russian ground forces entered the airport on the morning of 25 February.

Timeline of 24–25 February 2022: ground forces cross the border at 0400, helicopters enter at 0930, landing at 1100, Russians hold the airfield around 1300, counterattack around 1730, VDV withdraw into the woods around 2200, Russian ground forces arrive on the morning of the 25th, shown as bars and markers — Figure 2. Timeline, 24–25 February. Dashed bars mark phases whose start or end times vary between sources or are not given — own work, based on sources 2 and 3

Decision Point Analysis

Table of options and choices at four decision points: Decision 1, fight from prepared positions with air defence; Decision 2, break contact down a side street and preserve the force; Decision 3, the Russian command turns the Il-76 wave back; Decision 4, crater the runway and pull back — Figure 3. Options and choices at each decision point. Orange borders mark the option taken — own work, based on sources 1–3

Decision 1: Helicopters inbound (defending commander, about 1030 on the 24th) Of (a) fighting from prepared positions with MANPADS and anti-aircraft guns, (b) pulling the northern post in and concentrating everyone in the southern cantonment, and (c) abandoning the airfield in advance, the defenders chose (a), keeping the runway blocked. For a force armed mainly with small arms, engaging the helicopters from prepared positions as they landed appears to have been the best available option. Several helicopters fell, but some 300 troops still landed.

Decision 2: Give up the airfield, save the force (defending commander, about 1300) Ammunition was running low and no reinforcements had arrived. Of (a) holding to the last round, (b) counterattacking to relieve the northern post, and (c) breaking contact to preserve the force, the defenders chose (c). They are reported to have got out without fatalities, though this rests on interviews. Leaving the airfield also appears to have freed Ukrainian artillery to shell it without risk to its own troops.

Decision 3: Send the follow-on transports? (Russian command, afternoon of the 24th) The plan called for 18 Il-76s to bring in about 1,000 airborne troops. Instead, the wave turned back in mid-air. Why is not confirmed: shells falling on the runway, the VDV's incomplete hold on the airfield and the air-defence threat have all been suggested. As a result, the troops already landed had to hold on alone, without tanks or artillery, until the ground forces arrived.

Decision 4: What to do with the retaken runway (Ukrainian command, night of the 24th) Of (a) digging in on the airfield to meet the approaching mechanized column, (b) cratering the runway and pulling back, and (c) pursuing the VDV into the woods, Ukraine chose (b). Denying Russia the use of the airfield served the purpose better than holding it. Russian forces retook the airport on 25 February but could not bring in heavy transports, and they left the area on 1 April.

Lessons

Air assault and linkup: An air assault works only if ground forces link up in time. When the mechanized column was slowed in a narrow corridor, the landing force was isolated. RUSI cites this case to show the danger of air assaults aimed at positions rather than along axes of advance.
Air defence and survivability: Flying low evaded radar but not MANPADS.
Mission command and preserving combat power: A small, mostly conscript unit held its positions, then got out at the right moment, leaving room for the shelling and counterattack that followed.
Fires and manoeuvre: Artillery fixed the airborne troops, and the ground counterattack went in right after the air strikes.
Denial: A key facility that cannot be held can still be denied to the enemy, which may be enough to achieve the operational aim.

Unresolved Questions

Composition of the counterattack force: WOTR (air assault and mechanized brigades, Special Operations Forces) and MWI (the defending brigade) disagree.
Reason for and size of the Il-76 abort: WOTR describes 18 aircraft from Pskov; Ukraine's state news agency describes about 15 from Tula diverted to Mazyr in Belarus.
Russian helicopter losses: RUSI confirms two downed by MANPADS in the first wave; WOTR estimates six or seven in all; a defender's account claims six.
Exactly when and how the runway was cratered.
Size of the defending force: about 200 (WOTR) or about 300 (other reports).

A Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter banking against the sky, showing its coaxial rotors and weapon pods under the stub wings — Photo 2. A Ka-52 attack helicopter at the 2009 Moscow air show. The type covered the landing force at Hostomel — Photo: Newsted, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Take command of the defending force in the "Hostomel Airport" scenario and make these decisions yourself.

Sources

RUSI, Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022 (2022-11-30), pp. 25–26. https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf (accessed 2026-10-13)
War on the Rocks, reconstruction of the battle of Hostomel airport (2023-08-10). https://warontherocks.com/the-battle-of-hostomel-airport-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Modern War Institute at West Point, "An Airfield Too Far" (2022-05-05). https://mwi.westpoint.edu/an-airfield-too-far-failures-at-market-garden-and-antonov-airfield/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Ukrinform, retrospective on the defence of Hostomel airport (2026-02-27). https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4096065-hostomel-3502-meters-that-broke-the-kyiv-in-three-days-plan.html (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikipedia, Battle of Antonov Airport, for cross-checking. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Antonov_Airport (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, Hostomel airport aerial photo file page (CC BY 3.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gostomel-airport.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, Ka-52 photo file page (CC BY 2.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ka-52_Alligator,_MAKS_2009.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)