North Kordofan's dry season: can the desert-flank push relieve El Obeid?

Overview (BLUF)

Between 25 July and 2 October 2026 the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Joint Forces, a coalition of Darfuri armed movements, drove the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) out of most of North Kordofan. The direction of the advance matters. Rather than push straight west from El Obeid along the trunk road to an-Nahud, they went north through Bara, out to Sodari in the north-western semi-desert (25 September), and then collected al-Mazroub, which had been left between the two (2 October). The capture of al-Mazroub is an SAF claim; we found no RSF statement and no independent confirmation.

Most coverage of El Obeid frames it as a humanitarian emergency that could become "the next El Fasher" (sources 28, 42). This column asks a different question: what is the desert-flank push trying to cut, and whom does the coming dry season favour?

We reach three judgements. First, the push targets one of the RSF supply axes feeding the pressure on El Obeid. The main southern artery through an-Nahud, al-Khuwei and Babanusa in West Kordofan is untouched. Second, the common belief that "the dry season favours the army" does not fit the record: the late-2025 dry-season gains were the RSF's, and in 2026 the SAF advanced in the middle of the rains. Third, the most likely picture to April 2027 is an SAF that widens its north-western flank while the RSF presses El Obeid with drones rather than ground assaults. Even so, that picture is less likely than not.

The evidence has clear limits. Most town-level control information comes from one side, and we found no reporting after 21 October, so "now" in this column effectively means mid- to late October. One-sided statements are marked claimed and single uncorroborated reports reported.

The Situation as of 27 October 2026

Some background first. In early 2025 the SAF retook most North Kordofan towns and reopened the Kosti–El Obeid road, but its offensive stalled by mid-year without entering West Kordofan. When the dry season set in late in 2025, the RSF took El Fasher (26 October), Babanusa (1 December) and Heglig (8 December). By December, Bara, Umm Sumeima, al-Khuwei and Kazgil were back in RSF hands and El Obeid was surrounded on three sides (source 1). Bara kept changing hands: in March 2026 the RSF retook it ten days after an SAF recapture (sources 2, 3). On 30 June the conflict-data organisation ACLED judged that the RSF had effectively encircled El Obeid from the north, west and south, leaving the SAF only an eastern supply corridor, and that a full takeover was improbable while attrition continued (source 4). Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) documented at least 14 checkpoints and 51 km of berms and trenches around the city (source 5).

The sequence since July is below. Dates come mainly from the Wikipedia 2026 timeline (a secondary compilation) and Sudan Tribune, whose article pages were blocked, so we relied on search summaries (source 6).

Date (2026)	Event	Nature of the evidence
25 Jul	Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh and nearby villages retaken	Announced by the Darfur governor and Joint Forces leader, claimed (sources 6, 7)
27 Jul	Full control of the Khartoum–El Obeid road. Same day, the RSF commander reportedly let field commanders launch operations without central approval	SAF claim, AFP report (sources 6, 8)
Late Jul	Retreating RSF raid Umm Badr, Sodari, al-Mazroub and other villages; on the 29th SAF drones hit RSF convoys in the area	Local reports, SAF claim (sources 6, 9)
Aug	RSF block food into al-Mazroub; cholera and market looting reported	Local reports (source 10)
13–14 Aug	Fighting at Jabra al-Sheikh and Bara; clashes over Umm Arada, about 25 km south-west of El Obeid	Competing claims (source 11)
6–7 Sep	Hamrat al-Wiz and al-Safiya retaken	SAF claim (source 6)
17 Sep	"11 areas" retaken. A local emergency-room member said the RSF had pulled out of Hamrat al-Sheikh, al-Mazroub and Sodari in large numbers, moving to an-Nahud, Ghebeish and Wad Banda in West Kordofan	SAF claim, local testimony (sources 12, 13)
18–19 Sep	al-Jamama retaken	SAF and Joint Forces claim (source 14)
25 Sep	Sodari retaken. The same day an SAF drone strike on al-Mazroub market left 17 dead	SAF claim, widely reported (source 15)
2 Oct	al-Mazroub taken. An SAF special forces spokesman called it the link between North and West Kordofan and said the aim was to cut RSF supply lines. Residents said the RSF had left in September, came back after Sodari fell and pulled out again as the SAF approached	SAF claim, no RSF statement (sources 16, 17)
3 Oct	RSF execute at least 25 civilians in Umm Badr	Reported; suggests the RSF were still present (source 6)
10–18 Oct	SAF air strikes: an-Nahud (10th), Abu Zaima (15th, five children died), Umm Sumeima (16th, an RSF media official died), al-Dibab in West Kordofan (18th, at least 150 deaths alleged)	Reported and alleged (source 6)
20 Oct	RSF drone hits Tandalti power station, cutting power to North Kordofan	Reported (source 6)
21 Oct	More than 600 bodies recovered in Bara, mostly attributed by volunteers to RSF reprisals	Middle East Eye report, via secondary compilation (source 6)
22–27 Oct	No reporting found	—

Plotting the towns shows the shape of the advance. Using OpenStreetMap (OSM) coordinates, al-Mazroub lies about 116 km west of Bara and about 61 km south-south-east of Sodari in a straight line (Figure 1, source 48). In other words al-Mazroub was not the tip of the advance but a pocket left between Bara and Sodari. The SAF took the more distant Sodari first and cleared al-Mazroub a week later, which fits residents' accounts that the RSF returned to al-Mazroub after Sodari fell. From Sodari, the north-western tip of the advance, Umm Badr is a further 127 km or so.

As of late October, it is reasonable to treat El Obeid, the road towards Khartoum, Bara and Sodari as SAF-held. al-Mazroub rests on the SAF claim alone. For Jabra al-Sheikh, the July recapture claim conflicts with an Anadolu report that it "remains under RSF control" (source 19). There are signs of an RSF presence into mid-October at Umm Badr, a gold-mining area in the far north-west, and at Umm Sumeima, about 64 km west of El Obeid. An-Nahud, Ghebeish, Wad Banda, al-Khuwei and Babanusa in West Kordofan are RSF-held. Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan are held by the SAF but blockaded by the RSF and the SPLM-N.

The "siege" of El Obeid has also changed shape. The three-sided encirclement of June is no longer the picture; what remains is ground pressure from the west and south-west overlaid by a drone blockade. The city holds about 500,000 people, more than 83,000 of them displaced (source 18). RSF drones struck a college on 9 September and a University of Kordofan dormitory on 1 October (five dead, 47 injured). On 20 October they hit the Tandalti power station in White Nile State, east of El Obeid, and the government has accused the RSF of striking fuel facilities (sources 6, 18, 19).

Two Supply Axes

The RSF's Kordofan front is supplied from Darfur along two broad families of routes (Figure 1).

1. The southern road axis. From Darfur through Babanusa, Ghebeish, an-Nahud and al-Khuwei in West Kordofan to the west and south-west of El Obeid. On the OSM map this is the El Obeid–an-Nahud trunk road. It is the main artery for the pressure west of El Obeid and for the South Kordofan sieges (sources 1, 12). In ACLED data for April 2023 to 19 September 2026, of 723 attacks in West Kordofan, 142 were at Babanusa, 119 at an-Nahud and 112 at al-Khuwei, all on this road (source 18).
2. The northern desert axis. From Kufra in south-eastern Libya through the Jebel Uweinat area where Libya, Egypt and Sudan meet, into the North Darfur desert (Wadi Howar, Malha, Bir Mirgui), then along the old caravan route of Darb al-Arba'in (the Forty Days Road) into north-western North Kordofan. Citing military sources, Sudan Tribune described the road as a corridor the RSF used to move fighters and equipment from Darfur (sources 13, 20).

Each segment of the northern axis has its own evidence. The UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported that a Libyan armed group around Kufra passed recruits, weapons and fuel to the RSF and used Kufra airport (sources 21, 22). In September 2026 the UN Fact-Finding Mission pointed to supply networks transiting Chad, Libya (Benghazi, Kufra, Jufra) and Somalia; the UAE denies involvement (source 23). 2025 material from the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan describes supplies flowing from eastern Chad and southern Libya to a base at Bir Mirgui in North Darfur (sources 24, 25). The RSF took the Jebel Uweinat triangle in June 2025 (source 26). In August 2026 the Joint Forces claimed to have destroyed an RSF convoy in the desert near the Libyan border; Reuters could not verify this (source 27). Russia's bases in southern Libya are covered in our column From Wagner to Africa Corps.

But a single line from Kufra to al-Mazroub is our inference. No source maps the route end to end. A Sudanese media report that an SAF strike at Umm Badr on 28 September left a Libyan officer advising the RSF dead is also single-source (source 6). If it is right, Umm Badr may be where the Libyan route enters North Kordofan. Malha to Umm Badr is about 214 km in a straight line (source 48).

The SAF's line that it has "cut supply lines" is therefore better read as "squeezed one of several". Sodari and al-Mazroub close the eastern end of the northern desert axis, but they do not reach the southern road axis that feeds the pressure west of El Obeid and in South Kordofan.

Season: Testing "the Dry Season Favours the Army"

Sudan's main rainy season runs from June to September and in some years into October (sources 30, 31). Rainfall in June–September 2026 was below average, and the main harvest runs from October 2026 to January 2027 (sources 29, 32, 33). The usual assumption is that once the rains stop and the ground dries, heavy vehicles and supply trucks move again, which favours the side with heavier armour and logistics, the army.

The record does not bear this out (Figure 2). The big gains of the late-2025 dry season were the RSF's: El Fasher, Babanusa and Heglig. The SAF's gains came in early 2025 and during the July–September 2026 rains (sources 1, 6). The RSF besieged El Obeid from 2023 to early 2025 without taking it (source 4). Rather than the season favouring one side, whichever side held the initiative when the season turned used the window.

Conditions this year are also different. The rains were light and the SAF has already moved through the wet season, so the "opening" effect of the dry season is weaker than usual: both sides are effectively in it already. The dry season widens movement for both. We add one inference of our own: clear skies and tyre tracks on dry ground make vehicle columns crossing the desert easier to spot and strike from the air. As the imagery in Figure 1 shows, the north is sparsely vegetated semi-desert with little cover. The SAF has extended its air strikes to an-Nahud, Nyala and towards the Chadian border (source 6). This year's dry season therefore offers openings both to SAF air interdiction and to an RSF main body that withdrew intact into West Kordofan. In our view the contest turns less on "whose season it is" than on "who squeezes the other's supply axis first".

Humanitarian conditions are tied to the season as well. As of 3 September 2026 the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) counted 19.5 million people in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 or worse, famine risk in 14 areas and diesel prices that doubled between March and June (source 29). The International Rescue Committee (IRC) reports that fuel moves in small containers (source 28). With the harvest overlapping the front line, which roads lorries carrying fuel and food can use shapes both military supply and people's livelihoods.

Competing Hypotheses 1: What Is the SAF After?

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) sets several hypotheses against the evidence and favours the one that is least contradicted, not the one with the most support (sources 44, 45). Evidence consistent with every hypothesis has no diagnostic value and is left out. Cells read C (consistent), I (inconsistent) or N (not applicable). Each I scores −1 times its weight (high 2, medium 1, low 0.5). The score ranks hypotheses; it is not a probability.

• S1 The desert flank is the main effort. Clear Umm Badr, then push along Darb al-Arba'in into the North Darfur desert and link up with the Joint Forces' interdiction near the Libyan border.
• S2 The north is a shaping operation; the main effort is west or south. Secure El Obeid's north, then go via Umm Sumeima and al-Khuwei to an-Nahud, or south to relieve Dilling and Kadugli.
• S3 Consolidation. Hold the gains, rely on air strikes and drones, and wait on the truce and diplomatic track.

Evidence (source, date)	Credibility	Weight	S1	S2	S3
E1. Military sources: the aim is to push towards Darfur along Darb al-Arba'in (Sep, source 13 summary)	Medium	1	C	I	I
E2. SAF spokesman: al-Mazroub links North and West Kordofan; the aim is to cut supply lines (2 Oct, source 17)	Low (party claim)	0.5	C	C	I
E3. No new ground-capture claims 3–21 Oct; air strikes concentrated on an-Nahud, Umm Sumeima and al-Dibab (source 6)	Medium	1	I	C	C
E4. SAF leadership rejects the truce plan as giving the RSF "time to regroup" (23 Sep, source 39)	Medium	1	C	C	I
Inconsistency score			−1.0	−1.0	−2.5

Three items were removed as non-diagnostic. The August claim of a convoy strike in the border desert and Chad's accusations of cross-border strikes fit both S1 and the air-centred S3. That the SAF took several villages the RSF had already left, and that the Joint Forces are also fighting in West Darfur, contradict none of the hypotheses.

Tentative conclusion. S3 is the most contradicted. We judge it likely that the SAF continues offensive operations in the dry season. Whether the main effort is the desert (S1) or west/south (S2) is a roughly even chance. The two are not mutually exclusive: securing the north first and then wheeling west is possible. We hold this judgement with low confidence.

Sensitivity check. Two rows decide it. E1 is a search summary of a blocked article quoting anonymous military sources; if E1 is wrong, S2 leads. The E3 lull may be a post-rains pause or simply the reporting gap after 21 October; drop E3 and S1 leads. Desert or west cannot be settled with the evidence available now. Indicators 2, 3 and 4 below will settle it.

Competing Hypotheses 2: The RSF's Dry-Season Course

• R1 A dry-season ground counteroffensive. A coordinated ground offensive west and south-west of El Obeid, as in late 2025.
• R2 Drone blockade and defence of West Kordofan. Strike El Obeid's infrastructure and rear cities with drones, hold the an-Nahud–Babanusa line on the ground, and weight the South Kordofan sieges alongside the SPLM-N.
• R3 Shift the effort elsewhere. Move to other fronts such as Blue Nile or the Darfur borders, or turn inwards to manage defections.

Evidence (source, date)	Credibility	Weight	R1	R2	R3
F1. Since al-Mazroub, drone strikes only, with no reported ground counterattack (1 Oct dormitory, 9 Oct, 20 Oct power station, fuel-facility accusations; sources 6, 18, 19)	Medium	1	I	C	C
F2. Reported devolution of authority to field commanders on 27 Jul and claimed RSF commander defections Aug–Oct (mostly SAF-side; defections also run the other way; source 6)	Medium	1	I	C	C
F3. Signs of RSF presence at Umm Badr (3 Oct) and Umm Sumeima (16 Oct) into mid-October (source 6)	Low	0.5	C	C	I
Inconsistency score			−2.0	0	−0.5

Removed as non-diagnostic: the RSF's September pullback into West Kordofan, which fits preparation for a counterstroke, defence and a shift elsewhere alike; the long-range drone strikes reaching Gedaref, Kassala and Khartoum airport on 18–19 October; and the 16 September capture of Jabal Kadam in Blue Nile together with the continuing South Kordofan sieges. The late-2025 precedent is a starting point (a prior), not evidence of current intent, so it is handled in the key assumptions check rather than the matrix.

Tentative conclusion. It is likely that R2 is the RSF's main course to January 2027. It is unlikely that a coordinated ground counteroffensive (R1) retakes Bara or al-Mazroub by April. A shift of effort elsewhere (R3) is also unlikely. We hold this judgement with low confidence.

Sensitivity check. F1 is fragile over time: the 2025 offensive did not begin until late October, so three quiet weeks are weak evidence. F2 rests largely on defection figures announced by the SAF. If both rows are wrong, the gaps between the three hypotheses almost vanish. The RSF's Chinese-made FH-95 long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at Nyala airport and its stock of loitering munitions (at least 40 as of February 2026) are the means to sustain R2 (sources 34, 35). Conversely, if the SAF claim to have downed about eight FH-95s in ten days in late September is true, a drone blockade will be harder to sustain (source 36).

Key Assumptions Check

#	Assumption	Basis	Rating	What would show it wrong	Effect if wrong
1	The SAF actually holds al-Mazroub	SAF statement; residents say the RSF left (sources 16, 17)	Caveated	RSF recapture claims or reported fighting at al-Mazroub or Sodari	Weakens S1 and scenarios A and B
2	The RSF withdrew rather than was defeated, and its main body is intact in West Kordofan	September local testimony of "massive pullbacks" (sources 12, 13)	Caveated	Large surrenders around an-Nahud; SAF entry without resistance	R1 weakens further; A strengthens
3	The northern desert axis is one of several supply axes, not the main artery	The UN panel's three routes (eastern Chad, southern Libya, CAR); fighting concentrated on the southern road (sources 18, 24)	Unsupported (inference)	RSF activity west and south of El Obeid drops markedly after al-Mazroub	Our low estimate of the northern cut's effect would need revising
4	The dry season favours the SAF	Conventional wisdom only; the 2025 record says the opposite (source 1)	Unsupported	SAF ground entry into West Kordofan in Nov–Dec	Our seasonal judgement would need revising
5	After devolution and defections, the RSF struggles to coordinate a multi-axis offensive	27 Jul devolution report; defection claims (source 6)	Caveated (defection figures mostly SAF claims)	Simultaneous ground attacks from two or more directions west and south-west of El Obeid in Nov–Dec	R1 and scenarios B and C rise

Assumptions 3 and 4 are unsupported, so both carry over into the indicator list below.

Quality of Information Check

Weakly sourced items that were used, or might tempt use, are listed separately.

Item	Source type	Corroboration	Reliability	Used for
Capture of al-Mazroub (2 Oct)	SAF spokesman via Al Jazeera; some resident accounts	No RSF statement, imagery or other independent confirmation	Party claim	S1; scenario horizontal axis
Egyptian Air Force strike on the Uqaydat mine (10 Oct, 72+ dead) and accusation of Egyptian involvement in a Nyala strike (16 Oct)	Wikipedia compilation; the latter an RSF accusation	Primary sources not checked	Low	Not used for conclusions
US envoy's contact with the SAF leadership at New Alamein (around 4 Oct, a lunch hosted by Egypt's president)	One news-aggregator source (source 41)	None	Low	Truce indicator only
Report that the US withdrew recognition of the SAF leadership's "ruling authority"	Lower-tier outlet (source 40)	None	Low	Not used
Scale of RSF commander defections, Aug–Oct	Mostly SAF-side announcements	Defections in the other direction also claimed	Low to medium	F2; assumption 5
About eight FH-95s downed in late September	SAF military sources (source 36)	None	Low	R2 sensitivity
August convoy strike in the border desert	Joint Forces statement (source 27)	Reuters could not verify	Low	Removed as non-diagnostic
Sudan Tribune articles, Jul–Sep	Pages blocked; search summaries	Partly overlap with Al Jazeera and Anadolu	Medium	Timeline; E1

Outlook: November 2026 – April 2027

Likelihood terms follow the scale in US Intelligence Community Directive 203 (source 46). Confidence is a separate concept and is stated in separate sentences.

Almost no chance	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly even chance	Likely	Very likely	Almost certain
1–5%	5–20%	20–45%	45–55%	55–80%	80–95%	95–99%

Two axes give four futures. The horizontal axis is whether the SAF holds and extends the north-western desert flank (Umm Badr and beyond) or stalls or is pushed back. The vertical axis is whether the RSF can mount a coordinated ground offensive or stays with a drone-led posture.

	RSF drone-led	RSF coordinated ground offensive
SAF extends the flank	A. Desert-flank closure: the SAF takes Umm Badr and extends interdiction towards Darb al-Arba'in. The RSF keeps striking El Obeid's power and fuel with drones. El Obeid's north stabilises but the southern road axis is intact. Unlikely (the most likely of the four)	B. Trade-off: while the SAF advances in the north-west, the RSF attacks west and south-west of El Obeid on the ground from the an-Nahud side (towards Umm Arada and Kazgil). Unlikely
SAF stalls or falls back	D. Attritional stalemate: dispersion or truce pressure halts the SAF short of Umm Badr, and both sides strike each other's infrastructure with drones. Unlikely	C. A repeat of 2025: the RSF returns to Sodari, al-Mazroub or Bara and pressure on El Obeid grows on three sides again. Very unlikely

A is the most likely of the four, but still less likely than not. Taking the horizontal axis alone, it is likely that the SAF holds and extends its flank. Taking the vertical axis alone, it is also likely that the RSF stays with a drone-led posture. We hold this outlook with low confidence, because most control information is party claims, there is no reporting after 21 October, and we have no order of battle figures for either side.

Indicators to Watch

#	Indicator (observable threshold)	Points to	Where to look	When
1	UN Security Council decision on the Darfur arms embargo and the Sudan Panel of Experts: repeated one- or two-month extensions, a one-year renewal, or lapse	A lapse weakens monitoring of outside supply and raises the risk of B and C	Council records	Early December (around the end of the two-month extension of 9 October; our estimate)
2	RSF reaction at al-Mazroub or Sodari: reports of an RSF return or RSF recapture claims	B, C	Both sides' statements, Al Jazeera, Sudan Tribune	Nov–Dec
3	SAF claim to Umm Badr, or reports of movement west along Darb al-Arba'in into North Darfur	A, B; SAF hypothesis S1	Both sides' statements, independent reporting	Nov – Jan 2027
4	SAF ground attacks at Umm Sumeima, al-Khuwei or an-Nahud	SAF hypothesis S2	ACLED, both sides' statements	Dec – Feb 2027
5	Drone strikes on El Obeid's power and fuel facilities: monthly strikes without ground attacks point to A or D; strikes accompanied by ground attacks at Umm Arada or Kazgil point to B or C	A/D or B/C	ACLED counts for Sheikan locality (monthly record 27, June 2026)	Monthly
6	Truce track: a signed text of the Quad (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt) 90-day truce, or SAF leadership acceptance	Towards D; downgrades the rest	Government statements, Reuters	Any time

For reference, Umm Arada lies about 23 km south-west and Kazgil about 44 km south of El Obeid (straight-line distances from OSM coordinates; sources 43, 48).

The truce track is blocked for now. In September 2025 the Quad proposed a three-month truce and a nine-month transition; in November the SAF leadership rejected it as biased (sources 37, 38). On 23 September 2026 the US tied the SAF leader's UN General Assembly visa to acceptance of the 90-day truce plan, and the Sudanese government replied that a truce would only help the RSF regroup (source 39). We found no reporting of truce talks for 5–27 October. The Quad is itself split, with Egypt now reported as a kinetic actor on the SAF side and the UAE accused of backing the RSF. We therefore judge it unlikely that the Quad secures a truce before the dry-season campaign.

Limits of the Method

Structured analytic techniques lay reasoning out so that others can check it; they do not guarantee that it is right. The C/I ratings and weights in the two matrices are our own judgements. Even in a controlled experiment that randomly assigned 50 analysts, evidence that ACH reduces confirmation bias was mixed, and there were signs it can make judgements less consistent (source 47). Here the bigger limit is the evidence: most control information is party claims, there is nothing after 21 October, and we found no seasonal trafficability data for the sand sheets and clay plains. The satellite background in Figure 1 is a 2016 composite and shows neither current cultivation nor positions. The indicator list is the most useful part of this column, more than the likelihood words: when the indicators move, we will revise.

Sources

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