From Wagner to Africa Corps: three years of Russian military expansion in Africa

Overview (BLUF)

After Wagner's founder died in a plane crash in August 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defence brought the group's African networks under state command. The new label is the "Africa Corps". The switch came in Burkina Faso (January 2024), Libya and Niger (April 2024) and Mali (June 2025). In the Central African Republic (CAR), no switch had been confirmed by autumn 2026 (Figures 1 and 2).

This column makes two judgements. First, the owner changed but the bargain did not: regime protection in exchange for mineral concessions. Second, as a state organisation the force's combat role has narrowed. In Mali in 2026, Russian personnel concentrate on defending the capital region, escorting convoys and providing air and drone support. One-sided statements are marked claimed and single uncorroborated reports reported.

Background: From Private Company to State Body

According to the statement of reasons in the EU Official Journal, after Wagner's founder died, command of Russia's military operations in Africa passed to the Africa Corps under the Ministry of Defence, with a senior officer of military intelligence (GRU) in charge. Western governments treat the organisation as a state body. On 7 November 2024 the UK listed the Africa Corps, with "Wagner Group" as an alias, under its Libya sanctions, and on 16 December the EU sanctioned the same GRU officer (sources 1, 2).

Russia moved into the space the West left. French forces left Mali in August 2022 and the CAR in December 2022. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) closed on 31 December 2023 at the Malian government's request. US forces finished leaving Niger in September 2024, and France handed over its bases in Chad in January 2025, Côte d'Ivoire in February and Senegal in July (sources 3–8).

Country by Country

1. Mali: Wagner arrived in late 2021 and helped government forces retake Kidal in late 2023. The US State Department put the contract at about $10 million a month (source 3). On 25–27 July 2024, near Tinzaouaten on the Algerian border, a Wagner and Malian army convoy was attacked by Tuareg separatists and the al-Qaeda-linked group JNIM. Reuters identified 23 Wagner fighters missing in action and two taken captive but could not establish how many died. The rebels claimed to have shot dead 84 Russians; Russian military bloggers put Wagner deaths at 20 or more (sources 9, 10). On 6 June 2025 Wagner announced its departure, declaring "mission accomplished". AP and AFP reported that the Africa Corps was staying and taking over Wagner's units (sources 11, 12). US officials estimated about 2,000 Russian personnel of both organisations in June 2025, and as many as 2,500 were reported in early 2026 (sources 3, 11).
2. Burkina Faso and Niger: The Africa Corps announced on Telegram in January 2024 that about 100 personnel had reached Burkina Faso, with 200 more to follow, to protect the transitional leader and train local forces (sources 13, 14). In April 2024 Niger's state broadcaster announced that 100 Russian military instructors and an air defence system had arrived in Niamey (sources 3, 15).
3. Libya: The UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported that Wagner arrived in October 2018 for technical support and provided combat support in 2019–2020 with 800–1,200 personnel (source 16). A joint analysis by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the University of Texas found infrastructure expansion at six air bases after the Africa Corps arrived in April 2024 (source 17). Il Sole 24 Ore reported that expansion at Brak al-Shati began in March 2024 (source 18). After the Syrian government fell in December 2024, Russian cargo flights to Libya increased (source 19). The loss of Syria appears to have sped up an existing plan rather than started a new one.
4. CAR: Wagner arrived around 2018 alongside Russian weapons and instructors and came to control security tasks and mining concessions (source 20). AP, citing a CAR military official, reported that Russia's deputy defence minister visited several times in 2025 to demand a switch to the Africa Corps and payment for its personnel, and that Bangui hoped to offer gold, uranium and iron instead of cash (source 21). In the 28 December 2025 presidential election, provisional results gave the incumbent a third term with about 76% (source 22). In July 2026 the Wall Street Journal reported that about 500 remaining Wagner fighters control the distribution of the opioid tramadol (sources 23, 24, secondary summaries). We found no official source confirming a switch to the Africa Corps.
5. Sudan: The US Treasury sanctioned the Wagner-linked firms M Invest and Meroe Gold, holders of gold exploration concessions, in July 2020, and the EU sanctioned both in February 2023 (sources 25, 26). In April 2023 CNN reported that Wagner had supplied surface-to-air missiles to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (source 27). In February 2025 Sudan's foreign minister claimed there were "no obstacles" to a naval base agreement; neither ratification nor actual basing has been confirmed (sources 28, 29).
6. Coastal states: The BBC, citing a Reuters estimate, reported that 100–200 Russians arrived in Equatorial Guinea from August 2024 to protect the presidency (source 30). On Togo, AEI's Critical Threats reported that on 9 July 2026 a sanctioned Russian cargo ship unloaded military vehicles for Mali at Lomé and an Africa Corps escort took them to Bamako. The opposition claimed that Russian forces are in the north; the foreign minister denied any Africa Corps presence and acknowledged only Russian trainers (sources 31–33). AP reported that armoured vehicles and artillery unloaded from sanctioned Russian ships at Conakry, Guinea, in January and May 2025 were trucked to Mali (source 34). On Madagascar, Bloomberg relayed the National Assembly speaker's account that a Russian military plane brought 40 troops and 43 crates of weapons in December 2025 (source 35).

Business Model: From Cash and Mines to State Contracts

Under Wagner, the model was a swap of regime protection for cash and mining concessions. In June 2023 the US Treasury sanctioned Wagner funding companies, including one that receives most of the output of the CAR's Ndassima gold mine (sources 3, 36).

Under state control, the counterparties have shifted to the Russian state and Russian companies. On 16 June 2025 construction began on a gold refinery near Bamako airport. According to Reuters, it is owned 62% by the Malian state and 38% by Russia's Yadran Group. Its capacity has been reported as 200 tonnes a year, though other reports give 100 tonnes for the first phase (sources 37, 38). Niger nationalised Orano's SOMAÏR uranium mine in June 2025 (sources 39, 40). In July it signed a civil nuclear memorandum with Rosatom, and Russia's energy minister said uranium was the main aim (source 41). Information operations are part of the package. The EU sanctioned "African Initiative", which presents itself as a news agency, in December 2024 and the UK followed in July 2025 (sources 1, 42).

Changing Operational Pattern

In early September 2025 JNIM declared a blockade on fuel imports and burned tanker after tanker on the roads from the Senegalese border (sources 43, 44). On 25 April 2026 JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) struck Kidal, Gao, Mopti–Sévaré, Kati and the outskirts of Bamako at once. Mali's defence minister died in a suicide car-bomb attack on his home in Kati (sources 45–48). Encircled in the former MINUSMA base, the Africa Corps left Kidal on 26 April under a deal with the FLA. The Africa Corps claimed it evacuated its wounded and heavy equipment first; an FLA commander claimed the Russians burned installations and vehicles before leaving (sources 46, 49, 50).

Since then Russian forces have weighted the defence of the capital region and supply routes over the north. The Congressional Research Service summarises reports that Russian forces protected fuel imports during the blockade (source 3). In a September 2026 report, the US research group The Sentry wrote that Mali contracted six Turkish-made Akıncı drones in August 2024 and that, according to interviewees, strike approval can go up to Africa Corps commanders (source 51). On 6 October the FLA pulled out of Kidal and the Malian army re-entered with the support of its "Russian partners" (sources 53, 54).

The human rights record follows the force. In May 2023 the UN human rights office reported strong indications that more than 500 people died at Moura in March 2022 during an operation by Malian troops and "foreign military personnel". Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that since January 2025 the army and Wagner forces executed at least 12 Fulani men and forcibly disappeared at least 81 others. It also reported that eight civilians died in a June 2026 air strike in Mopti region that the Africa Corps claimed as its own operation (sources 52, 55, 56).

Western and Regional Responses

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and their withdrawal from ECOWAS took effect on 29 January 2025 (source 57). They announced a 5,000-strong joint force in January 2025 and launched it at a summit in Bamako that December (sources 58, 59). On 27 February 2026 the US lifted sanctions on three senior Malian officials designated over Wagner, and in March Reuters reported that Washington was close to a deal to resume intelligence flights over Mali (sources 60, 61).

Outlook and Implications

What follows is analytical inference from open sources, not prediction.

• A credibility test. The negotiated exit from Kidal undercut Russia's claim to be a reliable security provider; a Chatham House analyst said the attacks showed the limited capacity of Russian forces (source 47). The October return to Kidal is a symbolic recovery only. Other governments may weigh their contracts against what happens in northern Mali.
• Thin forces, broad promises. Contingents of a few hundred to about 2,500 per country that guard regimes, escort convoys and train local forces at once leave little capacity for offensives. An analyst cited by the Congressional Research Service suggested Russia's appeal in the Sahel may have reached a high-water mark (source 3).
• Shifting supply lines. If the Libyan bases and the ports of Conakry and Lomé are linked up, Sahel supply could arrive from both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic (sources 17, 31, 34).
• The concession model persists. The CAR's attempt to pay in minerals shows that the exchange of security for concessions can continue under state control. As deals move into formal documents such as the refinery and the nuclear memorandum, the target for sanctions and scrutiny also moves from front companies to the state.

Sources

1. EU Official Journal, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3188, listings for Russia's destabilising activities (2024-12-16). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202403188 (accessed 2026-10-21)
2. UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), Libya financial sanctions notice designating the Africa Corps (2024-11-07). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/672c6e4d094e4e60c466d27f/Notice_Libya_071124.pdf (accessed 2026-10-21)
3. US Congressional Research Service (CRS), Mali In Focus IF12389 (2026-04-08, EveryCRSReport copy). https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2026-04-08_IF12389_eafb70071b5b5ecad891e918583c30947bf78996.html (accessed 2026-10-21)
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