The Krynky Bridgehead (October 2023 – July 2024): The Cost of Holding a Foothold Across the River

2026-10-13 · 2023-10-20 – 2024-07-17

Overview (BLUF)

In mid-October 2023 Ukrainian marines crossed the Dnipro in small boats and entered the village of Krynky on the left bank in Kherson Oblast. ISW confirmed entry into the village from footage around 20 October, and Ukraine officially acknowledged the left-bank operation on 17 November. The bridgehead held through winter and spring but never expanded. A Russian claim to have taken it in February 2024 was unfounded, but on 17 July it was reported that, with the positions destroyed, the troops had withdrawn around June. Ukraine's military leadership never officially confirmed the withdrawal.

Krynky shows how different it is to seize a foothold across a river on a drone-dominated battlefield and to hold it. A bridgehead of light infantry without heavy equipment survived on fire support from the right bank, but every resupply run, rotation and evacuation depended on rubber boats at night. Whether it fixed significant Russian forces in the south is still disputed.

Background and Strategic Context

After withdrawing from Kherson in November 2022, Russian forces dug in on the left bank of the Dnipro, and the river became the front line. From February 2023 Ukrainian forces probed the left bank with small raids. In October 2023, after the southern counteroffensive had stalled, elements of the marine brigades set up footholds at several points on the left bank; Kyiv Post reported elements of four marine brigades taking part.

Ukraine's stated aims were to hold a bridgehead on the left bank, push Russian artillery out of range of the right bank, and fix Russian forces in the south. Analysts added a political purpose: showing that Ukraine was still on the offensive after the counteroffensive had stalled.

Terrain and Weather

Here the Dnipro is several kilometres wide, with swampy islands and channels (Kyiv Independent). The left-bank floodplain is low, waterlogged woodland and marsh, and south of Krynky it is bounded by the Konka, a tributary that cannot be waded (Figure 1). Even a Russian military channel said the soft floodplain and near-total lack of hard roads made it hard to bring in heavy weapons. The same ground also ruled out a Ukrainian vehicle crossing. Once the village had been reduced to rubble, the remaining cellars were almost the only shelter.

Forces and Dispositions

Ukraine: light infantry from the marine brigades formed the core, with Territorial Defence and naval special operations elements and strike-drone units. Fire support came from artillery, MLRS and drones on the right bank. An open-source estimate in early November put each bridgehead at 200–300 troops; unofficial unit reports in March 2024 put 60–100 marines in the cellars of Krynky.
Russia: elements of a naval infantry brigade, a motor rifle division of the 18th Combined Arms Army and an airborne assault division held the left bank, with clear superiority in artillery, aviation and FPV drones. Ukraine claimed up to 80 FPV drones a day were launched at Krynky; this has not been independently verified. Russian supply routes also ran close to the river and were exposed to Ukrainian drones.

Course of the Action

Schematic map of the Krynky bridgehead: Ukrainian fires from the right bank, the night boat route via the islands to the left bank, a 2–3 km no man's land between the riverbank and the village, the cellar-based bridgehead, the Konka river and Russian positions to the south, and Russian FPV, glide-bomb and artillery fire — Figure 1. Krynky bridgehead, schematic (Oct 2023 – Jul 2024). Positions, distances and scale are approximate; not the current situation — Own work, based on sources 1–4

Crossing and foothold (October 2023): small-boat crossings began in mid-October. Alongside villages further downstream, the marines set up a second foothold at Krynky. Most crossings were made at night and no heavy equipment was taken over.
Pinned down (November–December): Ukraine officially acknowledged the operation on 17 November. Russia replied with air strikes and shelling; Ukraine reported eight air strikes on the Krynky area in a single day around 1 November. Most buildings in the village were destroyed, but the marines kept their positions. The bridgehead barely grew.
Cellar defence (January–May 2024): the marines stayed in cellars, resupplying and rotating only at night. One account says the wounded sometimes waited days or weeks for evacuation. On 20 February the Russian defence minister reported that Krynky had been "cleared"; on the 21st Ukraine's southern command denied it, and ISW assessed that Ukrainian forces still held a limited bridgehead. Delays in US aid probably made supply harder.
Withdrawal (June–July): on 17 July Ukrainian media, citing military sources, reported that the troops had withdrawn "several weeks ago" because the positions had been largely destroyed and holding on no longer made sense. A military spokesperson said the positions were completely destroyed but that missions on the left bank continued.

Timeline bars for four phases from October 2023 to July 2024: crossing in October, pinned down in November–December, cellar defence January–May 2024, withdrawal June–July. Below: about 20 Oct entry into Krynky, 17 Nov official acknowledgement, 20 Feb Russian capture claim and 21 Feb denial, March 60–100 troops in cellars, 17 Jul withdrawal reported — Figure 2. Krynky bridgehead timeline. Colour shows the nature of each item (blue: Ukrainian statement or report, red: Russian claim, amber: independent assessment) — Own work, based on sources 1–6

Decision Point Analysis

Matrix of four decision points with the options and the course taken: DP1 night crossing by small boats with infantry only, DP2 a small cellar garrison plus right-bank fires, DP3 Russian isolation and attrition by air, artillery and FPV drones, DP4 withdrawal while keeping up fire pressure — Figure 3. Options and choices at each decision point. Amber borders mark the course taken. Option sets are reconstructed from open sources and the scenario — Own work, based on sources 1–6

DP 1: how to cross under observation (Ukrainian marine units, October 2023) The options were (a) a daylight crossing in amphibious vehicles to get mass across at once, (b) dispersed night crossings by small boats carrying only light infantry, covered by right-bank fires, (c) waiting for better EW cover or weather, or (d) a feint downstream followed by a crossing at Krynky. In practice it was (b): the left-bank ground would not carry vehicles and Russian drones watched the river. The foothold was won, but from the start its combat power was capped at light infantry. This is the scenario's phase 1, "Crossing under observation".

DP 2: how to hold the foothold (Ukraine, November 2023 – March 2024) The choices were to push the perimeter out for depth, keep a small garrison underground and fight with right-bank fires, drones and EW, reinforce heavily to expand the bridgehead, or clear the evacuation backlog in daylight. The small underground garrison was chosen, reducing exposure in a setting where almost any daytime movement was seen. The price was that the bridgehead could not grow, and the boat runs themselves became a major source of losses. The scenario's phases 3, 4 and 6 deal with this decision.

DP 3: how to eliminate the bridgehead (Russia, October 2023 – June 2024) Russia could clear it quickly by ground assault, isolate and wear it down with aviation, artillery and FPV drones, or merely contain it and use its troops elsewhere. It leaned on isolation and attrition by fire while also launching repeated ground assaults. The floodplain made heavy equipment hard for Russia to use as well. The February capture claim was untrue, but in the end the positions were destroyed and a withdrawal was forced. In exchange, Russia appears to have had to keep substantial forces in this sector.

DP 4: reinforce or withdraw (Ukraine, June 2024) The options were to send a fresh company to rebuild the positions, withdraw to the right bank and islands while keeping fire pressure on the left bank, hold as is, or switch to small raids from the islands. According to reports, withdrawal was chosen, to preserve the troops. With no official confirmation, the exact timing and method are unknown. This is the scenario's phase 7, "Reinforce or withdraw".

Lessons

Sustainment: a bridgehead lives as long as its supply line. When every resupply, rotation and evacuation depends on rubber boats, the boat run becomes the most dangerous act of all.
UAS and EW: on a drone-dominated battlefield, daytime ground movement is close to impossible. Survival depends on dispersion, going underground and electronic warfare.
Balancing ends and means: a bridgehead that cannot gain ground is easily justified by "fixing the enemy". That effect is hard to measure while the costs are plain; whether to continue should be judged against criteria set in advance.
The information contest: claims such as February's capture announcement need checking against independent evidence. Here, ISW's footage-based assessment provided that check.
Mission command at small-unit level: for isolated posts of a few dozen troops to hold for months, junior leaders must be able to decide on fire requests, rotations and evacuations themselves.

Unresolved Questions

Timing and manner of the withdrawal: not officially confirmed; reports point to around June 2024.
Military effect of the bridgehead: expert estimates have the Russian grouping in this sector growing from about 64,000 in autumn 2023 to as many as 120,000 by July 2024, but whether Krynky caused that is not established.
Losses: neither side has published official figures. Ukrainian claims about Russian losses are unverified.
Figures such as the number of drone attacks and the share shot down or jammed are Ukrainian claims.
ISW originals and NYT reporting were blocked (403 or paywall), so summaries in other outlets were used.

Take command of the marine company yourself in the "Krynky Bridgehead" scenario. How you decide each boat run and each evacuation sets how long the bridgehead lasts.

Sources

Kyiv Post, marines digging in on the Dnipro bridgehead (2023-11-01). https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23542 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Kyiv Post, left-bank marines under Russian artillery and air strikes (2023-11-20). https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24399 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Kyiv Post, underground positions and night boat resupply on the left bank (2024-03-20). https://www.kyivpost.com/post/29829 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Kyiv Independent, what the Krynky operation accomplished (2024-07-18). https://kyivindependent.com/with-krynky-lost-what-did-the-perilous-operation-accomplish/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
The Defense Post (AFP), Russian capture claim, Ukrainian denial and ISW assessment (2024-02-21). https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/02/21/ukraine-denies-losing-dnipro-bridgehead/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, reports of the Krynky withdrawal (citing Suspilne and Liga.net) (2024-07-17). https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/07/17/ukrainian-forces-allegedly-withdraw-from-krynky-in-kherson-oblast/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
ISW, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 26 November 2023 (original returned 403; checked via summaries). https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2023 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikipedia, "Battle of Krynky" (cross-check only). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Krynky (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the aerial photo of the Dnipro and the Antonivskyi bridge near Kherson (Public domain). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:View_of_Kherson_and_Antonovskiy_bridge,_2006.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the photo of the Dnipro and the Antonivskyi bridge from the left bank (CC BY-SA 4.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B9_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%BB%D0%B5._%D0%92%D0%B8%D0%B4_%D1%81_%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE_%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B0_%D0%94%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0_%D0%BD%D0%B0_%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82_%D0%B8_%D0%90%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BA%D1%83._%D0%A4%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE_6_%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%8F%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8F2021%D0%B3.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)