In depth | Krynky — why a foothold that held for nine months could never become a bridgehead

2026-09-30 · 2023-10-20 – 2024-07-17

Overview

Part 1: The Krynky Bridgehead (October 2023 – July 2024) told the story of the foothold; this piece takes apart the decisions inside it. In mid-October 2023 Ukrainian marines crossed the Dnipro in small boats and, by 20 October, were confirmed by footage in the north-eastern edge of Krynky [9]. They held part of the village until mid-2024 but probably never all of it [8]. Why did a position that survived nine months never become a bridgehead, and which decisions fixed that early?

Strategic and operational context

Ukrainian sources describe two layers of intent. The maximal one, according to a brigade-level source and a parliamentary defence committee source, was to break the thin Russian line from Korsunka to Oleshky and reach the Crimean isthmus, about 80 km away [8]. The practical one was to widen the southern front and draw Russian forces from Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk [8]. The UK Ministry of Defence judged the fighting "highly unfortunate" for Moscow, which had left the west bank to keep the sector quiet (claim) [12].

The order reached the marines only days before the operation. Three brigades were to take a 30 km strip from the Antonivka railway bridge to Krynky in three to four days and push on to the M-14 highway, another 5–7 km inland, on foot and without heavy equipment [8]. The 36th Brigade took the railway bridge and Poima, the 38th the solar farm between Pishchanivka and Pidstepne, the 35th Krynky; the 37th was in reserve [8]. Within one to two weeks the first two footholds were given up and the effort narrowed to Krynky [8]. From then on it was a test of how long a light infantry outpost could live across a river under Russian air superiority.

Terrain and weather in detail (OAKOC)

Detailed sketch map of the Krynky sector: the Ukrainian right bank with fires and drone units, the island belt and night boat route, the Konka mouth danger point, the estimated bridgehead covering about half the village, the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and 104th Guards Airborne Division to the south, glide bombs from Crimean airfields, and the M-14 about 9 km away — Figure 1. The Krynky sector in detail (sketch; unit positions and routes estimated; Oct 2023 – Jul 2024 only). Rivers, roads and villages from OpenStreetMap [22] — Own work, after sources 1, 2, 4, 8, 13

Observation and fields of fire. The right bank stands on a bluff: sampled points near Tiahynka and Lvove lie at 25–56 m, while Krynky lies at about 7 m, Korsunka at 9 m and Kozachi Laheri at 13 m [21]. Right-bank observers looked down on the village [2]; by day, every boat lane was equally visible to Russian drones [4].

Avenues of approach. There was no dry approach: main channel, islands on foot, then the Konka or smaller channels, at first taking hours to a full day [8]. Only around December 2023, once the smaller channels had been cleared of mines, did the route become continuous and shrink to 40–50 minutes [8].

Key terrain. The village cellars, the woods either side of Krynky, and the landing points. The woods toward Kozachi Laheri and Korsunka sheltered Russian supply lines [8][18]; the landing points were where marines were most often hit [8].

Obstacles. The Konka is impossible to wade [1]. The floodplain is soft, with almost no hard roads, which stopped Russian armour as much as it stopped Ukrainian vehicles [1]. The Kakhovka dam breach of 6 June 2023 had eroded the islands and banks and reportedly postponed a summer landing [8].

Cover and concealment. Holes on the islands filled with water after a few spadefuls [8]. Once glide bombs had levelled the houses, cellars were the only cover; a military spokesman said the marines stayed underground "24/7" [4].

Weather and light. ERA5 reanalysis for the Krynky grid cell gives a monthly mean of 13.1 hours of darkness in October 2023, rising to 15.4 hours in December, then falling to 8.2 hours in June 2024 [24]. Mean daily minimums fell from 9.5°C in October to −2.2°C in January, with a low of −10.7°C; November 2023 brought 154 mm of rain, more than any other month of the operation [24].

Bar chart of monthly hours of darkness and a line of mean daily minimum temperature from October 2023 to July 2024, with decision points p1 to p7 and what-if branches x1 to x3 marked, and notes on strength estimates and the 40–50 minute route — Figure 3. Darkness, cold and the decision points. Weather: ERA5 via Open-Meteo for Krynky [24]; troop figures are estimates from sources 2, 4, 6, 8 — Own work

Organisation and command relationships

Company-level dispositions were never published; "est." marks estimates. Russian unit identifications come largely from milbloggers and the Ukrainian General Staff and should be read as claims.

Side	Echelon	Unit / element	Role and notes	Source
Ukraine	Operational group	Temporary "Katran" operational-tactical group	Coordinated the landing	[8]
Ukraine	Brigade	35th Marine Brigade with 137th Battalion	Main effort at Krynky; last to leave, July 2024	[8]
Ukraine	Brigade	36th Marine Brigade with 501st Battalion	Railway bridge and Poima, later Krynky; first to leave, winter 2024	[8]
Ukraine	Brigade	38th Marine Brigade	Solar farm, then Krynky; only brigade to ferry equipment	[8]
Ukraine	Brigade	37th Marine Brigade	Initial reserve	[8]
Ukraine	Support	124th and 126th Territorial Defence Brigades; 73rd SOF Centre	Earlier raids, island routes, boats	[8][27]
Ukraine	Fires	Right-bank artillery, HIMARS, drone strike units	Fire dominance from the right bank	[2][3]
Ukraine	Strength	Per bridgehead	200–300 (Nov, OSINT); 300–500 in total (Nov); 60–100 in Krynky cellars (Mar); under 200 (spring–summer)	[2][16][4][6]
Ukraine	Assault group	Representative group of 13	Landed 27 Oct in a boat rated for three (est. typical)	[8]
Russia	Grouping	Dnepr Group of Forces	Overall command on the left bank	[13]
Russia	Army	18th Combined Arms Army (26th Regt, 70th MR Div; 28th MR Regt)	First defenders near Krynky and Pishchanivka (claims)	[9][14]
Russia	Brigade	810th Naval Infantry Brigade	Arrived near Krynky in early October	[14]
Russia	Regiment	177th Naval Infantry Regiment	Near the railway bridge (claim)	[9]
Russia	Division	104th Guards Airborne Division	Combat debut early December	[13]
Russia	Division	7th Airborne Division (elements)	Near-rear positions (claim)	[14]
Russia	Air and fires	Glide bombs, TOS-1A, FPV drones	Up to 80 FPV a day in March (Ukrainian claim)	[2][4][6]

Ukraine committed the whole Marine Corps, but the far bank held a few hundred infantry fed by a handful of boats; the 36th Brigade had eight of its own [8]. Russia rotated formations through, and experts estimate its grouping grew from about 64,000 to up to 120,000 by July 2024 [10].

Month by month

Mid-October 2023: three footholds

Crossings began around 14 October [2]. Geolocated footage from 19 October showed marines in north-eastern Krynky, 2 km from the river; a Russian milblogger claimed they briefly reached the Kozachi Laheri–Krynky–Korsunka road before air strikes pushed them back to the northern outskirts [9]. Around 19 October an Iskander strike near the railway bridge cost the 36th Brigade about 90 casualties, according to a brigade source [8].

Late October – November: concentration on Krynky

On 31 October a Russian channel admitted that soft ground was keeping Russian heavy weapons away; Ukraine reported eight Russian air strikes on the Krynky area in 24 hours [1]. By early November the other two footholds had been abandoned [8]. Kyiv's first public acknowledgement came on 14 November, the Marine Corps statement on 17 November [3][18]. A mid-November weekend saw close to 20 Russian air strikes [2].

Animated map of the Krynky sector in five phases: night crossings at three footholds, concentration on Krynky, the cellar winter, FPV drones hunting the boat route, and withdrawal to the right bank and islands; the still frame shows the final situation in mid-July 2024 — Figure 2. Manoeuvre by phase (18-second loop; with reduced motion only the final situation is shown). Positions sketched and partly estimated — Own work, after sources 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

December – February: the cellar winter

The 104th Guards Airborne Division made its debut in early December and, the UK MoD assessed, "highly likely" took exceptionally heavy losses without reaching its objectives [13]. The route shortened to 40–50 minutes [8], but this was when Russia brought in more assault troops, used glide bombs to flatten most of the village and learned to hit the boats at river bends, where they slowed, and at landing points [8]. On 20 February Russia's defence minister announced that Krynky had been cleared; Ukraine's southern command denied it the next day, and ISW saw no visual evidence of a notable Russian advance [5][15].

March – May: underground

In March 60–100 marines lived in cellars, under attack by drones as long as it was light and patrolling the 2–3 km of no man's land to the river only at night [4]. From late winter, Russian fire on the mouth of the Konka meant boats often could not get through [8].

June – July: withdrawal

The last ground fighting Ukraine reported in Krynky was on 11 July; on 16 July DeepState's map showed the village under Russian control [6]. On 17 July sources told Ukrainian media that units had left "several weeks ago" [7], and a military spokesman said the positions had been "completely destroyed" while missions on the left bank continued [10][11].

Flooded riverside sheds and boat garages in Kherson, with only their metal roofs above brown water and a tree in the foreground — Photo 2. Kherson riverside after the Kakhovka dam breach, 6 June 2023. The flood reshaped the islands and banks the marines later had to cross [8][23] — Photo: ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Decision points in depth

The headings follow the training scenario; x1, x2 and x3 are what-if phases.

p1 Crossing under observation (19 October, 2200)

Knew: earlier raids had shown the river could be crossed; Russian FPV teams struck almost anything by day; the far bank would not carry vehicles [1]. Options: a daylight mounted crossing, dispersed night crossings by small boat, delay, or a feint. Decision: night crossings by light infantry, with no heavy equipment [1][8]. Otherwise: vehicles would have bogged in the floodplain [1]. The real flaw lay higher: a 30 km frontage with three separate footholds, against FM 3-90's call for concentration on a narrow front [20].

x1 A scattered landing (what-if, 20 October, 0300)

Situation: half the company ashore, three hours of darkness left. Recommended: regroup in the treeline and go in the next night. In reality landings were messy; one group of 13 lost its guide and waded through silt to the first cellars [8].

p2 First week: counterattacks and air strikes (late October)

Knew: Russian heavy weapons could not get forward; air strikes were increasing [1]. Options: dig into buildings and cellars with drones and mortars, push to the road, or wait for reinforcement. Decision: dig in at once, with observation drones and 120 mm mortars [1]. Otherwise: the push to the road had already been thrown back [9].

p3 The inflatable lifeline (mid-November)

Knew: supply came on a limited number of inflatable boats [2]; strength was perhaps 200–300 [2]. Options: small night runs under drone and EW cover, large runs, or cargo drones. Decision: small night runs, plus early-morning runs in fog [18]; volunteers later added cargo hexacopters able to lift 20 kg [8].

x2 The perimeter is broken (what-if, November)

Recommended: shrink to cellars and deny lost buildings by fire. In reality little ground changed hands in this period [2].

p4 Winter in the cellars (December – January)

Knew: the village was mostly destroyed, the water cold, and many losses happened in transit [4][8]. Options: evacuate a few on each night boat, mass evacuation by day, or thin the garrison. Decision: small evacuations and rotations at night [4]. Otherwise: daylight runs would have given up 15 hours of darkness for drone exposure [24].

p5 The capture claim (20–21 February)

Knew: the marines were still there; an assault was forming. Options: hold and report the facts, or pull back quietly. Decision: hold; the assault was reported repelled (Ukrainian claim) [5]. Otherwise: a quiet withdrawal would have handed Moscow a confirmed victory before its election, which ISW judged the claim was aimed at [15].

p6 Holding under the drones (March)

Knew: up to 80 FPV drones a day (claim), evacuation delays of days to weeks [4]. Options: a minimal underground garrison with right-bank fires, expansion, or withdrawal. Decision: the minimal garrison [4].

x3 An overstretched bridgehead (what-if, June)

Recommended: withdraw over several nights. In reality the bridgehead never grew [6][8].

p7 Reinforce or withdraw (June)

Knew: most positions were destroyed; boats could not always get through [8][11]. Options: a fresh company, withdrawal with continued fire pressure, holding, or raids from the islands. Decision: withdrawal, which Ukrainian sources said saved lives [7]. Otherwise: an officer argued it should have come in spring, in the foggy season, when everyone could still be brought out [8].

Doctrine re-read

What a bridgehead is (FM 3-90, para 18-66). A bridgehead is large enough to hold most of the crossing force, protects the crossing sites, keeps them out of direct fire and is a base for continuing the attack [20]. Krynky met none of these tests; its crossing site was 2–3 km away across no man's land [4].

Deliberate wet-gap crossing (paras 18-68, 18-70 to 18-72, table 18-3). A deliberate crossing is costly, needs combat power concentrated on a narrow front and surprise, and is normally conducted by a division or larger; the crossing rate sets how fast forces arrive [20]. With no bridging, a crossing rate set by small boats and Russian aircraft free to strike [6], the operation stalled between the phases "assault across the gap" and "secure the bridgehead line".

Defence of a linear obstacle (paras 9-56 to 9-58). FM 3-90 expects defenders to counterattack bridgeheads at once while higher echelons isolate them, or to contain several and eliminate them in turn, at the risk of letting them fortify [20]. Russia did all three: hasty counterattacks, isolation by glide bombs and drones, and the footholds reduced one by one.

Withdrawal (paras 11-71 to 11-73, 11-80). Withdrawals are moved to times the enemy cannot observe and are planned as if under pressure [20]. The "fog season" remark [8] is that paragraph in practice.

Relief in place (para 15-3). Simultaneous relief is quickest but most easily detected [20]; the river allowed only rotations by twos and threes.

Source criticism

When did it start? Crossings from 14 October [2]; footage in Krynky on 19–20 October [9]; Kyiv Post dated the downstream landings 22 October [1]; one assault group landed on 27 October [8]. Probes, entry and main body, not contradictions.

When was it acknowledged? Part 1 used 17 November, the Marine Corps statement [3]. The head of the Presidential Office had already said so in Washington on 14 November [18].

How many troops? 200–300 per bridgehead [2], 300–500 in total [16], 300–400 near Krynky according to Russian milbloggers [14], 60–100 in March [4], under 200 later [6]. Different dates and areas; the Russian count fits a narrative of constant reinforcement.

When did they leave? "Several weeks ago" [7]; "over the past week" according to DeepState [6]; gradually from winter, with the last brigade out in July [8]. A staged withdrawal reconciles all three [10][11].

Losses. The Marine Corps' November figures for Russian losses are unverified claims [3]; Oryx's photo-confirmed count is a floor, not a total [17]. On the Ukrainian side, police data published by Slidstvo.info listed 788 missing and 262 returned for burial, October to June [19], and one brigade reportedly had about 700 casualties [8]. None of these figures is official.

How far did they get? A November claim of pushing Russian forces back 3–8 km [26] sits poorly with sources who say the marines held about half the village [8].

Lessons

A foothold is not a bridgehead. Without vehicles, bridging or air defence across, plan a raid with a fixed end.
Count the crossing rate before the objective. A three-person boat sets how much can be held on the far side.
Light is a resource. Plan rotations and evacuations around hours of darkness and fog, and know when they will run short.
Landing points are the front line. Rotate and hide them; give them their own EW and medics.
Set the withdrawal criteria on the way in. The decision is easiest while the weather still allows it.
Report what you hold. In February a ground report was the answer to a capture claim.

Unresolved questions

The exact date and method of the final withdrawal.
Whether Russian reinforcement of the sector was caused by Krynky, and by how much.
Both sides' losses; the Ukrainian General Staff calls them a state secret [8].

Sources

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Kyiv Post, "Ukrainian Marine Corps Says Multiple Bridgeheads Secured on Left Bank of Dnipro River", 2023-11-17. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24255 (accessed 2026-10-14)
Stefan Korshak, "Embattled Marines on Dnipro Bridgehead Gain New Foothold Despite Swarms of Russian Drones", Kyiv Post, 2024-03-20. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/29829 (accessed 2026-10-14)
AFP, "Ukraine Denies Losing Dnipro Bridgehead as Moscow Touts Successes", The Defense Post, 2024-02-21. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/02/21/ukraine-denies-losing-dnipro-bridgehead/ (accessed 2026-10-14)
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