The Bilohorivka Crossing (May 2022): A Predicted Crossing Site and Fires That Waited

2026-10-13 · 2022-05-07 – 2022-05-13

Overview (BLUF)

On 8 May 2022 Russia's 74th Motor Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army) began bridging the Siverskyi Donets at a river bend west of Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian engineers had picked out this spot the day before as the most likely crossing site. After confirming the pontoon bridge, Ukrainian forces waited about 20 minutes for vehicles to bunch at both ends, then struck the bridge and the columns with artillery and aviation. Russian forces re-bridged over the following days, and each bridge was cut in turn; by the 13th they were back on the north bank. On 13 May the UK Ministry of Defence assessed that Russia had lost significant armoured manoeuvre elements of at least one battalion tactical group, along with its bridging equipment.

The lesson lies less in the weight of fire than in prediction and timing. The defenders were short of troops but knew where the enemy had to come. The attacker left out most of the basics of a gap crossing: air defence, counter-battery fire, security on both banks and deception (Figure 2).

Background and Strategic Context

After withdrawing from the Kyiv area in April 2022, Russian forces made the Donbas their main effort. By early May they were trying to encircle the Ukrainian grouping around Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. Crossing the Siverskyi Donets southwards from its north bank would let them wrap around that grouping from the west. A crossing could also threaten the highway to Bakhmut.

For Ukraine, the river line was long and troops were few. It could not hold every stretch of bank, so working out where the enemy would cross was the starting point of the defence.

Terrain and Weather

The river here is about 80 m wide (US Army Protection Professional Bulletin, hereafter PPB) and about 2.4 m deep on average, too deep to cross without a bridge. The south-west bank rises into hills of up to about 200 m elevation with pine and oak woods, giving Ukrainian forces a view over the river. The Russian site was low ground at a bend with gentle slopes on both banks, a "textbook" crossing site (Figure 1). In early May the trees were in leaf but did not fully hide the site or the assembly area on the north bank. On the morning of the 8th there was fog, and Russian troops added smoke and burning vegetation to cut visibility further.

Forces and Dispositions

Russia: the 74th Motor Rifle Brigade assembled in the north-bank woods with at least one battalion tactical group and pontoon engineers. No air defence was deployed to cover the crossing, and there was no sign of artillery being moved up to suppress Ukrainian guns (US Army Infantry).
Ukraine: artillery and observation elements of the 17th Tank Brigade and the 80th Air Assault Brigade were in the sector, supported by the Air Force. Engineers and EOD personnel reconnoitred crossing sites and UAS teams watched the likely ones. The main body stayed off the bank on the heights, both to avoid direct fire and to make the Russians feel secure.

Course of the Action

Schematic map of the Bilohorivka crossing: the Russian approach from the north-bank woods to the pontoon bridge at the bend, the lead elements halted in the low ground on the south bank, the Ukrainian observation line on the south-west heights, massed artillery and air strikes, and the re-bridging sites of 10–11 May and about 12 May further west — Figure 1. Bilohorivka crossing, schematic (7–13 May 2022). Positions, distances and scale are approximate; not the current situation. Sites ② and ③ rest on Ukrainian statements — Own work, based on sources 1–3, 5

Reconnaissance and prediction (7 May): Ukrainian engineers began terrain reconnaissance and judged the bend west of Bilohorivka the most likely site, essentially applying Russian site-selection doctrine in reverse.
Bridging and strike (8 May): boats were heard before dawn and UAS confirmed bridging. Ukrainian forces waited about 20 minutes until vehicles had bunched at both ends of the bridge, then struck with heavy artillery followed by aviation. Russian units that had already crossed halted in the low ground on the south bank and never reached the heights. The bridge was cut and vehicles were trapped on both banks.
Re-bridging attempts (9–12 May): on the 11th the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence claimed that 17th Tank Brigade artillery had destroyed pontoon crossings near Bilohorivka "once again". A last bridge towards Serebrianka was reportedly cut around the 12th.
Withdrawal (by 13 May): the remaining Russian troops fell back to the north bank. On the 13th the UK MoD called the attempt a highly risky manoeuvre and judged that Russian forces had made little progress in the area. ISW assessed that the losses at least temporarily disrupted Russian operations from the north. The 74th Brigade was withdrawn as combat-ineffective.

Decision Point Analysis

Table comparing seven gap-crossing requirements with what the Russian force did on 8 May: air defence, counter-battery and suppression, security on both banks, deception, a wide front and a fast push to the far-bank heights were not carried out; obscuration was tried but was insufficient — Figure 2. Gap-crossing requirements and the Russian execution. Assessments from two US Army articles (2025), partly inferred from imagery and reporting — Own work, based on sources 1, 2

DP 1: how to hold a long river line (Ukrainian defence, 7 May) The options were (a) man the near bank in strength, (b) spread out thinly along the whole line, (c) analyse crossing sites, put observers and UAS on the likely ones, keep the main body on the heights and pre-plan fires, or (d) shell the far-bank assembly areas pre-emptively. Option (c) was chosen. A pontoon bridge needs a certain width, current and approach routes, so candidate sites are few. That let a small force concentrate observation and fire at the decisive point. This is the scenario's phase 1, "Where will they cross?".

DP 2: how to cross (Russian brigade, 8 May) Doctrine called for crossing at several points on a wide front, covering the bridge with air defence and counter-battery fire, and securing both banks first. The Russian force put a single bridge across one bend. As Figure 2 shows, air defence, counter-battery fire, security on both banks and deception were all missing. The US Army analysis suggests an attempt at surprise, resource shortages or pressure from higher command as possible reasons, but none is confirmed. The result was that Ukrainian UAS could watch the site throughout and guide the artillery.

DP 3: when to fire (Ukrainian fires, 8 May) The choices were to fire on the bridge at once, wait for vehicles to bunch and then mass fires, counterattack the bridgehead with armour, or hold fire and reconnoitre further. Ukrainian forces waited about 20 minutes. Firing at once would only have cut part of the bridge and the enemy would have tried again; waiting allowed the bridge and the columns on both banks to be hit together. That judgement depended on confidence that observation would not be lost. The "20 minutes" comes from one engineer's account and has not been independently confirmed. This is the scenario's phase 3, "A bridge in the fog".

DP 4: the enemy comes again (both sides, 9–13 May) Russian forces re-bridged at the same bend and further west without changing their method. Rather than go down into the low ground for a ground counterattack, Ukrainian forces appear to have kept up UAS observation and struck each new bridge. A Ukrainian report claimed a ground counterattack on the 10th, but the US Army analysis concludes that artillery and aviation decided the fight without one. This corresponds to the scenario's phases 6 and 7.

Matrix of four decision points with the options and the course taken: DP1 crossing-site analysis with observation from the heights, DP2 the Russian single bridge at one bend, DP3 waiting about 20 minutes and then massing fires, DP4 repeated Russian re-bridging and continued Ukrainian observation and strikes on each bridge — Figure 3. Options and choices at each decision point. Amber borders mark the course taken. Option sets are reconstructed from open sources and the scenario — Own work, based on sources 1–3

Lessons

Intelligence and terrain analysis: if you cannot hold everywhere, find where the enemy has to come. Crossing-site analysis made up for too few troops.
UAS and fires together: a crossing site without air defence lies open to drones. Because observation never lapsed, the defenders could choose their moment.
Combined arms (for the attacker): a gap crossing is not an engineer task alone. Leave out air defence, counter-battery fire, security on both banks or deception, and the bridge becomes the weakest point.
Tempo and the far bank: when the first units across stop in low ground, the bridgehead lives off the bridge alone. Cut the bridge and the bridgehead is finished.
The danger of repetition: trying again the same way hands the opponent the same target.

Unresolved Questions

Russian losses: US Army Infantry, citing The Times (12 May), gives 50–70 vehicles; open-source counts are around 70. Estimates of personnel losses vary so widely that this article does not use them. No Ukrainian losses were reported.
Number and dates of crossing attempts: Ukrainian statements range from two to nine. The 5 May attempt at Dronivka is not clearly sourced.
The "about 20 minutes" wait and the number of pontoon sections rest on one Ukrainian engineer's account (Newsweek) and are not independently confirmed.
Reported river width ranges from 35 to 80 m depending on the source.
ISW's 14 May assessment returned 403 and was checked through summaries in other outlets.

Take command of the defending battalion yourself in the "Bilohorivka Crossing" scenario. When you open fire changes the outcome a great deal.

Sources

US Army Infantry, "Russian River Crossing Failure During the Battle of the Siverskyi Donets" (Spring 2025; army.mil 2025-03-31). https://www.army.mil/article/284080/russian_river_crossing_failure_during_the_battle_of_the_siverskyi_donets (accessed 2026-10-13)
US Army Protection Professional Bulletin, "Failure to Consider Protection in Large-Scale Combat Operations: The Siverskyi Donets River Crossing" (2025-09-16). https://home.army.mil/wood/contact/publications/ppb/Failure-to-Consider-Protection-in-Large-Scale-Combat-Operations-The-Siverskyi-Donets-River-Crossing (accessed 2026-10-13)
RFE/RL, report on the UK MoD intelligence update of 13 May (2022-05-13). https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russian-advances-halted-war-crimes/31847676.html (accessed 2026-10-13)
ISW, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 14 May 2022 (original returned 403; checked via summaries). https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Ukrainska Pravda, Ukrainian MoD statement on destroying the crossings again (2022-05-11). https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/11/7345599/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikipedia, "Battle of the Siverskyi Donets" (date cross-check only). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Siverskyi_Donets (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the PMP folding float bridge photo (Public domain, US Army). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMP_Folding_Float_Brisge_1996.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)