Defending the Pokrovsk Axis (December 2024 – December 2025): Ground Held by Drones, Supply Lines Cut

2026-10-13 · 2024-12-07 – 2025-12-10

Overview (BLUF)

Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are coal-mining towns and road and rail junctions in western Donetsk Oblast. After taking Avdiivka in February 2024, Russian forces pushed west toward them, in what ISW later called a 21-month campaign. This analysis covers one year of it, from December 2024.

Ukrainian forces used drone surveillance and strikes to make up for scarce infantry and, by February 2025, had sharply slowed the Russian advance to the south and south-west. Instead of renewing frontal assaults, Russian forces began interdicting Ukrainian supply roads with drones in July 2025 and, from late October, pushed teams of two or three into the town in large numbers. On 4 November ISW assessed that Russia had denied Ukraine the use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub. In early December Ukrainian forces gave up a salient south-east of the town to avoid encirclement. The central lesson of the axis: ground held by drones stays held only as long as the supply line behind it survives.

Background and Strategic Context

Russian forces attacked Pokrovsk head-on in spring 2024 without success. According to ISW, from autumn 2024 they switched to enveloping the town from the south and east. After taking Selydove in late October, they swung west and by mid-December were approaching Shevchenko on Pokrovsk's south-western edge. ISW nevertheless judged on 7 December that the Russian units on this axis were worn down after months of attacks.

For Ukraine, the axis was a supply junction supporting the defence of the northern Donbas. Judging from public statements, higher command intended to hold the towns while the attacker paid the higher price, but above all to avoid encirclement.

Terrain and Weather

The towns sit in open steppe and farmland divided into a grid by windbreak tree lines. The tree lines give small infantry teams covered routes; the fields between them are fully exposed to drones. The built-up areas are mine works, slag heaps and low-rise housing. Only a few paved roads lead into the towns, so supply is concentrated on a handful of routes (Figure 1).

Weather was a variable in the drone war. In November 2025 Ukrainian commanders said rain and fog had kept light FPV drones from flying properly, and that Russian forces exploited the gap.

Schematic of the Pokrovsk axis showing the Russian line of December 2024 and the swing west from Selydove, the drone interdiction zones on rear supply roads to the west and north-west from July 2025, the August penetration north of Rodynske toward Dobropillia and Ukrainian counterattacks cutting it at the base from both sides, small-team infiltration into the town from the south in October–November, and the south-eastern salient (Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar) given up in early December — Figure 1. Pokrovsk axis, schematic (Dec 2024 – Dec 2025). Positions, boundaries and scale are approximate and shown only up to December 2025; this is not the current situation — Own work, based on ISW assessment summaries (sources 1–6, 9) and LIGA.net (source 10)

Forces and Dispositions

Ukraine: Infantry battalions of line brigades held the front. Rifle companies were well under strength; battalion drone companies and brigade unmanned-systems battalions watched and struck the open ground. In the second half of 2025 air assault corps units and a marine brigade arrived, and in early November military-intelligence special forces were reported to have been inserted by helicopter.
Russia: Elements of several combined-arms armies were concentrated on the axis. ISW summaries describe a sequence of special forces infiltrating first, regular assault units following, and small assault groups exploiting. The specialist drone unit known as the Rubikon Center targeted Ukrainian supply routes and drone crews.

Course of the Action

Thin line, drone defence (Dec 2024 – Feb 2025): Ukrainian forces held the south-western approaches with a few strongpoints and drone surveillance. On 15 February 2025 ISW assessed that Russian advances south and south-west of Pokrovsk had slowed sharply over two weeks, citing degraded Russian frontline units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations. Local Ukrainian counterattacks were reported near Kotlyne and Pishchane at the same time.
Lull (Mar – Jun 2025): ISW judged that Russia might prioritise the Kostiantynivka direction in spring and summer.
Drone interdiction of supply roads (from Jul 2025): Russian forces pressed Ukrainian rear roads with longer-range FPVs, thermobaric warheads, "waiter" drones that settle by the roadside to wait for vehicles, and fibre-optic drones that cannot be jammed. ISW described this as a five-month battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effort.
Penetration toward Dobropillia (Aug 2025): On 11 August small Russian groups were reported about 10 km deep north of Rodynske (a claim by Ukrainian analysts; the sector command denied a breakthrough). ISW judged on 12 August that this was not yet an operational breakthrough, and on 18 August that Ukrainian counterattacks were retaking villages and cutting the penetration at its base.
Infiltration and encirclement threat (Oct – Dec 2025): From late October teams of two or three seeped into the town, targeting drone crews and command posts. A Ukrainian drone unit claimed nearly 100 such teams were entering each day. On 12 November ISW confirmed Russian control of about 46% of the town. In early December a Ukrainian air assault corps said it had withdrawn from the Lysivka–Sukhyi Yar area in an "organised manoeuvre" (Figure 2).

Timeline of five phases from December 2024 to December 2025: thin line and drone defence Dec–Feb, lull Feb–Jun, drone interdiction of roads Jul–Dec, Dobropillia penetration Aug, infiltration and encirclement threat Oct–Dec. Six dated ISW assessments and announcements are marked A–F below — Figure 2. Pokrovsk axis timeline. Blue marks the Ukrainian response, red the phases driven by Russia. Dates follow public assessments and announcements and are approximate — Own work, based on sources 1–6 and 8–11

Decision Point Analysis

Decision 1: How to hold a thin line (Ukrainian battalion and brigade, December 2024) The options were (a) a continuous trench line using every available rifleman, (b) a few strongpoints with drones striking the enemy's rotation and supply tracks, (c) a battalion counterattack to retake villages to the south, or (d) falling back to the edge of town. Public analysis points to (b). Short of people, units appear to have held space with sensors and fire. The result was the mid-February slowdown; a Russian military blogger complained that drones made rotations and resupply "impossible". The defence also inherited the drones' weaknesses: weather and electronic warfare. This corresponds to phases 1 and 2 of the scenario.

Decision 2: How to break a drone defence (Russian operational command, summer 2025) The options were (a) renewed frontal assaults led by armour, (b) shifting the main effort to another axis, or (c) striking not the defensive line but the supply roads and drone crews behind it. Russia chose (c), apparently judging it cheaper to cut the roads that fed the defence than to cross the drone-watched fields. ISW assessed that five months of interdiction cost Pokrovsk its function as a logistics hub.

Decision 3: Last-mile supply and rear security (Ukrainian battalions and corps, July – November 2025) Units could have kept running trucks fast at night or in convoys with electronic-warfare escort. Instead they sent small, frequent loads by unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), heavy drones and foot carriers, while engineers built netted corridors. Against infiltrators they hardened drone and command-post positions and formed search teams, and higher command inserted special forces. Supply kept flowing at reduced volume, but the rear was never fully cleared. This corresponds to phases 3, 5 and 6 of the scenario.

Decision 4: Hold or pull back (Ukrainian corps, December 2025) Holding the south-eastern salient risked encirclement reaching Myrnohrad. The corps chose to withdraw and straighten the line, citing the preservation of personnel, better logistics and a more even front. Reporting suggests infantry commanders on the ground who did not want their troops encircled also shaped the decision. On 10 December ISW assessed that Russian forces would very likely take both towns eventually, but at greater cost in time and personnel. This corresponds to phase 7 of the scenario.

Lessons

Surveillance-and-strike defence: When troops are scarce, drones hold space, but that capacity rises and falls with weather and electronic warfare. Defence plans need a bad-weather fallback.
Sustainment: Design logistics to remove big targets. Ground robots and dispersed carrying cut volume but kept the flow alive.
Drones and electronic warfare: Jamming does not stop fibre-optic drones. Physical screening such as netting, and dispersion, are needed as well.
Protecting command posts: Infiltrators went for drone crews and command posts rather than the front line. Alternate command posts and rear-area search plans must be prepared in advance.
Mission command and the timing of withdrawal: If the higher intent is to avoid encirclement, withdrawal is part of the plan. Commanders on the ground need agreed criteria for when to move.

Unresolved Questions

The scale of infiltration (about 100 teams, or up to 300 personnel, a day) comes from Ukrainian unit claims and has not been independently verified.
The date and location of footage of the early-November special forces helicopter insertion have not been independently confirmed. Ukraine denied the Russian Defence Ministry's claim that the entire inserted group was eliminated.
Ukrainian claims about how much of northern Pokrovsk was regained in December 2025 differ between sources.
No public figures show how much the drone interdiction actually reduced supply. Reports that ground robots carried most supplies are also unit estimates.
Battalion-level decisions here are composites rebuilt from patterns in public analysis.

To make these decisions yourself, take command of a battalion for one year in the training scenario "Pokrovsk Axis Defence".

Sources

Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 15 February 2025 assessment: advance near Pokrovsk slows (2025-02-16). https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/02/16/isw-russian-advance-near-donetsks-pokrovsk-slows-as-focus-may-shift-to-kostiantynivka-in-2025/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
ISW/Critical Threats, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 7, 2024 (original blocked to our fetcher; checked via search summary). https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2024 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 4 November 2025 assessment: 21-month campaign and air interdiction (2025-11-05). https://euromaidanpress.com/?p=372311 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Al Jazeera, infiltration tactics in Pokrovsk and Ukrainian drones (2025-11-06). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/6/russia-infiltrates-pokrovsk-with-new-tactics-that-test-ukraines-drones (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 12 August 2025 assessment: penetration toward Dobropillia (2025-08-12). https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/08/12/isw-russias-dobropillia-push-isnt-an-operational-level-breakthrough-yet/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 18 August 2025 assessment: Ukrainian counterattacks cut the penetration (2025-08-19). https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/08/19/isw-russias-advance-near-dobropillia-is-fracturing-under-ukrainian-counterattacks/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, sector command denies a breakthrough near Dobropillia (2025-08-12). https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/08/12/dnipro-command-flatly-denies-deepstate-report-of-russian-control-near-donetsks-dobropillia/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Kyiv Independent, report of a military-intelligence special forces raid in Pokrovsk (2025-11-01). https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-hur-launches-special-forces-raid-in-embattled-pokrovsk-media-report/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 12 November 2025 assessment: about 46% Russian control of the town (2025-11-13). https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/11/13/isw-russian-milbloggers-declare-pokrovsk-almost-taken-isw-says-evidence-shows-only-46-control/ (accessed 2026-10-13)
LIGA.net, withdrawal from some positions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (2025-12-08). https://news.liga.net/en/politics/news/defenders-retreated-near-pokrovsk-and-myrnohrad-leveling-the-front-map (accessed 2026-10-13)
Ukrainska Pravda, withdrawal from some positions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (2025-12-08; original blocked to our fetcher). https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/12/08/8010891 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, summary of ISW's 10 December 2025 assessment: outlook for both towns (2025-12-11). https://euromaidanpress.com/?p=379911 (accessed 2026-10-13)
TSN, 7th Rapid Response Corps commander on logistics in Pokrovsk (2025-11-28). https://tsn.ua/en/ato/ukrainian-units-may-enter-task-zone-7th-rapid-response-corps-commander-discusses-logistics-in-pokrovsk-2966393.html (accessed 2026-10-13)
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Wikipedia, Dobropillia offensive (cross-check only). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dobropillia_offensive (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the Myrnohrad mine administrative building photo (CC BY-SA 4.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stakhanov_Coal_Mine._Administrative_Building.JPG (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the Ukrainian ground robot photo (CC BY 4.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UA_Vepr_UGV_01.jpg (accessed 2026-10-13)