In depth | The Avdiivka withdrawal — what does it take to cover a decision that comes late?

2026-10-13 · 2024-02-13 – 2024-02-17

Overview

Part 1: The Avdiivka Withdrawal (February 2024) told the story; this piece goes inside it. Between 13 and 17 February 2024 Ukrainian forces lost the only paved road into Avdiivka, held a dirt-track corridor west toward Sieverne, and left the town on foot in small groups [1][2]. The question here: what did battalions and brigades have to get right to bring a force out once the decision to leave came late [1][10][12]? The scenario's ten phases (p1–p7 and the what-if phases x1–x3) are taken in turn.

A coke plant seen from a distance over a snow-patched field in winter haze, with rows of chimneys, conveyor bridges and rail sidings — Photo 1. The Avdiivka coke plant in winter 2024 (Commons dates it 17 February 2024). The open field in front is the kind of ground the withdrawing groups crossed — Photo: unknown author (47th Mechanised Brigade), CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Strategic and operational context

Russia had attacked Avdiivka since 10 October 2023, first trying to envelop it and then switching to small assault groups after costly mechanised assaults [1][13]. The town anchored Ukraine's first defensive line north of occupied Donetsk; OSW judged its loss "tantamount" to a breach of that line [11]. ISW expected the capture to bring Russia mainly political gains, timed before the invasion's second anniversary and the March presidential election [6].

Ukraine was short of artillery shells while about $60 billion of US aid stalled in Congress [6]. Russia used glide bombs in mass, and ISW assessed that in the final days it gained temporary, localised air superiority, probably for the first time in the war [3][4]. A brigade press officer claimed a seven-to-one disadvantage in troops [6].

The higher intent was conditional. The reserve 3rd Assault Brigade was to push Russian forces off the highway; a Ukrainian volunteer commander said that if this failed "in the next two or three days" the task would become organising a corridor for a deliberate evacuation [5].

Terrain and weather in detail (OAKOC)

Sketch map of Avdiivka and the villages to its west: coke plant, garden plots, road 00542 and Industrial Avenue, the lost junction, the hatched corridor to Sieverne, brigade symbols, Russian axes from three sides, the 3.5 km gap and the late-February line — Figure 1. Avdiivka withdrawal in detail (sketch). Places from OSM [18], heights from Open-Meteo [17]; units, Zenit, garden plots and corridor estimated. February 2024 only — Own work, after sources 1–3, 5, 8, 11

Observation. The town sits higher than the villages west of it: about 221 m at the centre against 185 m at Lastochkyne, 189 m at Sieverne and 174 m at Tonenke [17]. Whoever held the western edge looked down 30–45 m on the fields the corridor crossed; LWJ notes the "low-lying" villages Russia took next [1].

Avenues of approach. By OSM coordinates, Lastochkyne lies about 3.8 km west of the rail station and Sieverne about 5.4 km west-south-west [18]. Russian forces came from the north through the Ivushka garden plots toward the mouth of road 00542, from the east past the filtration station, and from the south via Zenit toward the Sieverne road [1][2]. The Ukrainian exits were the dirt tracks running west.

Key terrain. The 00542–Industrial Avenue junction [1]; after it fell, the corridor shoulders.

Obstacles. ERA5 reanalysis shows 27.5 mm of rain and snow on 9–10 February, a thaw to 14.3°C on the 14th, then frost: −2.4°C, −5.3°C and −6.5°C on the nights of 15–17 February [16].

Cover and concealment. West of town there are only fields and windbreaks. Ukrainian reports say Russia used fog in early February because fog blinds drones [1]; ERA5 does not record fog, so this rests on those reports. On 16–17 February darkness lasted from 17:51 to 07:33 [16], but thermal sights cut its value.

The place name. OSM gives the village's former Ukrainian name as Сєверне, now renamed Pivnichne [19]. Ukraine's 2010 romanisation writes "є" after a consonant as "ie" [21], hence "Sieverne". Lastochkyne was renamed Krynychne in September 2024 [20]. This piece keeps the 2024 names.

Organisation and command relationships

Company dispositions were not published; "est." marks estimates.

Side	Echelon	Unit	Role	Source
Ukraine	Group	Operational-strategic group "Tavria"	Sector command	[7][8]
Ukraine	Brigade	110th Mechanised	Held the town about two years without rotation; worn units out 13 Feb	[1][10]
Ukraine	Company	2nd Coy, 1st Bn, 110th	Zenit	[5]
Ukraine	Brigade	3rd Assault (reserve)	Retake the road, then cover the withdrawal	[1][5][9]
Ukraine	Battalion	2nd Assault Bn, 3rd	Plant's left flank; left "next to last"	[1]
Ukraine	Battalion	25th Assault Bn, 47th Mechanised	Reported last out of the plant	[1]
Ukraine	Brigade	53rd Mechanised	9th Quarter; covered Zenit's exit	[1]
Ukraine	Battalions	HUR, SSO, "Dozor", 225th Assault Bn	Held the corridor	[1]
Ukraine	Company	Scenario battalion	Two companies forward, one reserve (est.)	scenario
Russia	Brigades	114th MR with 80th Tank Regt and 30th MR, or 74th MR first	Northern thrust; attribution disputed	[1]
Russia	Brigade	1st "Slavic" MR	Took Zenit, 15 Feb	[1]
Russia	Brigade	60th	About 150 troops through a pipe, January	[1]
Russia	Units	35th MR, 239th Tank Regt, 24th Spetsnaz	Station and centre, 17 Feb	[1]

Totals are claims: 40,000–50,000 Russian troops in the area per Ukrainian officials [1], about 15,000 attackers per a brigade deputy commander [6]. A northern breakthrough threatened to cut off at least three brigades, "potentially 2,000–4,000 men" [5]. Several brigades with different radios shared one corridor; soldiers later blamed this for units leaving before others knew [1][9].

Hour-by-hour account

5–12 February: infiltration

By about 5 February Russian troops were roughly 1 km from the mouth of the 00542 [1]. Sources date the 3rd Assault Brigade's arrival anywhere from 3 to 13 February; many of its soldiers were new to combat, and officers found few prepared positions [1].

13 February: the depot and Zenit

Russian forces took the vehicle depot and cut Industrial Avenue [1]. Worn 110th Brigade units were pulled out, some "without prior coordination" [1]. Around 2100 the Zenit garrison was told to withdraw "on their own", covered by the 53rd Brigade [1]. Video confirms reserve brigade elements in combat by this date [1].

15 February: the junction falls

Evacuation vehicles could not reach Zenit in the morning, and six wounded were left [1][5]. Its troops crossed the fields on foot through a corridor reportedly 120 m wide [1]. In the afternoon Russian forces reached the 00542–Industrial Avenue junction and took Zenit [1].

16 February: the town splits

Geolocated video showed Russian troops in the central park [2]. ISW put the gap between Russian positions in the west and south at about 3.5 km, called the withdrawal "relatively controlled", and expected local counterattacks to be needed [2]. The 3rd Brigade received its withdrawal order [1].

17 February, 0000–0800: out on foot

The commander-in-chief announced the withdrawal shortly before 0100 to avoid encirclement [1][6]. The 3rd Brigade was largely out of the plant by about 0500 [1]. Small groups moved on foot along dirt tracks under artillery, drones and air strikes, with jamming cutting communications [1][9]. The 53rd Brigade left the 9th Quarter after dawn, just before Russia took the Sieverne road [1].

17–28 February: claims and a new line

Russia claimed "full control"; ISW saw no evidence of the large encirclements Russian sources described [3]. ISW also judged that scarce Ukrainian air defence had probably been committed to cover the withdrawal [3]. Ukraine left Lastochkyne on the 26th and Sieverne on the 27th, and said the line had stabilised at Tonenke–Orlivka–Berdychi; Reuters could not verify this [8].

Decision points in depth

x1–x3 are what-if phases built from typical situations, not reported events (Figure 2).

Timeline from 13 to 18 February with night bands, daily temperatures, events and the ten decision points in scenario order, what-if phases in orange, with a card for each decision below — Figure 2. Decision flow and timeline. Temperatures and daylight: ERA5 for the Avdiivka grid cell [16]; decision times follow the scenario — Own work

p1 Enemy at the road mouth (13 Feb, 0700)

Knew: small groups about 1 km from the road mouth (B2); a two-to-three-day deadline (A2); a rumour (F6) that the enemy was past the junction. Options: counterattack, dig in on the tracks, reconnoitre first, or join the plant. Decision: the reserve was committed to reopen the road [5]; it never reopened [1]. Otherwise: dispersed groups are hard to clear by counterattack, but conceding the road on day one would have handed over the junction earlier.

x1 Platoons cut off (13 Feb, 2000, what-if)

Situation: two platoons trapped with wounded, short of ammunition. Recommended: bring them out on foot in the dark. In reality: some reserve brigade soldiers were surrounded but reportedly got out [13].

p2 The junction is lost (15 Feb, 1500)

Knew: the road was closed and Zenit had fallen. Options: fortify the track shoulders and resupply at night, retake the junction, force a convoy through, or deny the junction by fire. Decision: units relied on the dirt tracks [1]. Otherwise: a counterattack would have spent the force that later held the corridor; FM 3-90 favours several routes over a few [15].

p3 The corridor narrows (15 Feb, 2300)

Knew: Zenit's troops had come out on foot, leaving wounded [1][5]; Russian sources claimed the Lastochkyne track was nearly cut [2]. Options: wait for orders, hold while pressing for a decision and planning, send a company south, or leave without orders. Decision: covering forces held the corridor [1]. Otherwise: analysts place the missed moment here; one monitor thought the final decision came around 15 February, and a retired British officer said a fighting withdrawal should have been planned three weeks earlier [10]. Planning routes, order and casualty evacuation costs no combat power [12].

x2 The western shoulder gives way (16 Feb, 0600, what-if)

Situation: enemy groups pushing south to cut the Sieverne track. Recommended: a local counterattack; FM 3-90 keeps the reserve forward to protect routes [15]. In reality: the corridor held until the withdrawal was done [1].

p4 The withdrawal order (16 Feb, 1600)

Knew: the town was split and the order had come. Options: cover the corridor and send wounded and support first, leave in one column, hand over and go first, or leave a company in the plant. Decision: covering forces held while the main body left [1]. Otherwise: a column on the 00542, already under Russian fire control, would have been a target for bombs and drones [1].

p5 Withdrawal under pressure (17 Feb, 0100)

Knew: the withdrawal was public; tracks were under fire; radios were jammed and did not match the neighbour's. Options: one vehicle move, small groups on several tracks at staggered times behind a rear guard, or everyone holding until all neighbours were out. Decision: small groups, mostly on foot [1]. Otherwise: waiting for confirmation without a working net risked the battalion at dawn.

A tall residential block with one section collapsed into rubble and a fire-blackened facade — Photo 2. Avdiivka's tallest residential building after repeated bombing, 18 January 2024 — Photo: National Police of Ukraine, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

x3 Groups missing at the rally point (17 Feb, 0300, what-if)

Situation: groups overdue, radios jammed, dawn three hours away. Recommended: find them by drone and guide them in with pre-agreed signals. In reality: some soldiers left without a formal order; some were left behind or captured [1][9].

p6 The last rear guard (17 Feb, 0500)

Knew: most groups were out; another brigade was still in the southern blocks. Options: break off once the neighbour is through, stay into daylight, leave now, or leave under the last fire missions. Decision: a reserve brigade battalion left "next to last"; the 53rd left at first light [1]. Otherwise: leaving at once would have closed the door on the 53rd.

p7 No second line (17 Feb, 1200)

Knew: shallow trenches, few mines. Options: dig in and mine in contact, counterattack, or fall back. Decision: units dug in and laid mines while in contact [1]; ten days later they stood on the Tonenke–Orlivka–Berdychi line [8]. Otherwise: a counterattack by exhausted units across fields overlooked from the town made little sense.

Doctrine re-read

Withdrawal under pressure (FM 3-90, ch. 11, paras 11-72, 11-73). The attacker tries to turn a withdrawal into a rout, possibly with air superiority; withdrawals are "inherently dangerous" and best made unobserved [15]. Avdiivka had both the air threat [3][4] and night movement [1].

Organisation (paras 11-75 to 11-78; para 8-43). A withdrawing unit forms a security force, a main body and a reserve, and may leave a detachment in contact to break away in stages [15]. The corridor's covering forces filled that role. The security force needs more combat multipliers than its size suggests [15]; MWI argues the same for air defence [12].

Planning (paras 11-80, 11-83). Always plan for withdrawal under pressure, and decide when support elements move, when forward elements displace and when the security force disengages [15]. These map onto p3, p4 and p6.

Execution (paras 11-88, 11-90, 11-92). The force least in contact leaves first, the main body uses multiple routes, and blocked routes are bypassed [15]. Paragraph 11-11, on casualty evacuation, reads differently after Zenit.

Infiltration (ch. 2, paras 2-82, 2-84). Sensors make undetected infiltration harder [15]; fog removed that edge [1]. Russian manuals were not consulted.

Animated map showing six phases in turn, from northern infiltration to the late-February line; the still frame shows the final situation — Figure 3. Manoeuvre by phase (18-second loop; reduced motion shows the final situation). Positions sketched — Own work

Source criticism

Prisoners. NYT sources put captured or missing at 850–1,000 [9]; a Russian general claimed about 200; US officials said Ukraine privately estimated about 100 [1]; OSW wrote "probably several hundred" [11]; on 29 March the commander-in-chief gave 25 [14]. They count different things on different dates. LWJ judged the top figure inflated [1]; the lowest comes from a party to the fight.

Timing. The announcement is "shortly before 0100" in AP and LWJ [1][6], "2 a.m." in the Kyiv Independent [10]. The AP report filed that night is closest to the event.

The last unit out. LWJ has the plant largely empty by 0500 on the 17th [1]; hromadske says the last 47th Brigade units left on the 19th [13].

Prepared positions. The Tavria commander said troops fell back to positions "prepared in advance" [7]; LWJ found no solid second line [1]; OSW saw a second line 5–15 km back, far less fortified [11]. The first was said on the day; the others are later analyses.

Controlled or chaotic. ISW saw no evidence of a chaotic retreat [2]; NYT sources called it ill-planned and late [9]. They describe different echelons: the force got out, while some groups paid for late coordination.

Lessons

Tie the deadline to preparations. "Two or three days" was a good trigger; routes, order and casualty evacuation should start on day one.
Once the road is gone, the corridor is the main effort. Resource its security force beyond its size.
Plan around mismatched radios. Liaison officers, set times, signals and rally points let you count who is out.
Plan casualty evacuation before the order.
Build the position you will fall back to.

Unresolved questions

Numbers of prisoners and missing.
When higher command first weighed withdrawal.
When the last groups left the plant (17 or 19 February), and when the reserve arrived.
Which Russian brigades led in the north.
Accounts of wounded left at Zenit remain unverified [5][13].

Sources

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