The Avdiivka Withdrawal (February 2024): Covering a Late Decision

2026-10-13 · 2024-02-13 – 2024-02-17

Overview (BLUF)

Russian forces attacked Avdiivka, an industrial town north-west of Donetsk city, from 10 October 2023. In early February 2024 infiltration groups came in through the garden-plot settlements north of the town and threatened its only paved supply road, and Ukrainian higher command committed a reserve assault brigade. On the afternoon of 15 February the road junction was nevertheless lost, and the Zenit strongpoint in the south fell the same day. Shortly before 0100 on 17 February the commander-in-chief announced a withdrawal to avoid encirclement.

Troops left in small groups along dirt tracks, mostly on foot. ISW judged it a "relatively controlled" withdrawal (16 February). FDD's Long War Journal (LWJ) found that most of the force got out, but that the withdrawal began late and there was no solid second line behind the town (22 March 2024). The case shows how covering forces and junior echelons paid for a decision that came late.

Background and Strategic Context

Avdiivka had been on the front line since 2014, and Ukrainian forces had fortified it for years with trenches and concrete shelters. Its pre-war population was about 31,000 (AP, February 2024). In October 2023 Russia tried to envelop the town from north and south; the early mechanised assaults were costly and made slow progress.

In early 2024 Ukraine was short of artillery ammunition and air defence because of delays in US aid. Russia, by contrast, used large numbers of glide bombs fitted with guidance kits. The defending brigade claimed about 60 bombs a day and a seven-to-one disadvantage in troops (16 February). ISW assessed that in the final days Russia gained limited, local and temporary air superiority and flew close air support (17 February).

Terrain and Weather

The town runs north–south. The coke plant and a slag heap lie to the north, garden-plot settlements (dachas) to the north-east and the Zenit strongpoint on the south-eastern edge (Figure 1). The only paved road into town was the 00542, entering from the north-west and joining Industrialnyi Avenue. Everything else was dirt tracks running west to Lastochkyne, Sieverne and Tonenke. West of the town lie open fields and windbreaks, so troops withdrawing on foot were exposed to observation and fire.

In early February soft ground made tank and armoured vehicle movement difficult. Fog reportedly hampered Ukrainian drone surveillance, and Russian infiltration groups used it.

Forces and Dispositions

Ukraine: A mechanised brigade that had held the town for months without rotation formed the core of the defence. Other mechanised brigades held the flanks and the 9th Quarter in the south. A reserve assault brigade arrived as reinforcement on 12–13 February; many of its soldiers were new to combat and there were few prepared positions in town (LWJ).
Russia: Several motor rifle brigades from the Central Military District and the 1st Army Corps. Ukrainian officials estimated 40,000–50,000 Russian troops in the area (cited by LWJ, claimed). In January Russia sent about 150 troops through a drainage pipe to the rear of the Zenit area (claimed by Russian sources), and in early February entered through the northern garden plots.

Course of the Action

Schematic map of the Avdiivka withdrawal: the paved supply road from the north-west and the junction lost on 15 February, the Russian northern infiltration through the garden plots in the north-east, the infiltration near Zenit in the south-east and the push to cut the Sieverne road, and the Ukrainian withdrawal routes west along dirt tracks to Lastochkyne, Sieverne and Tonenke — Figure 1. Schematic of the Avdiivka withdrawal (13–17 Feb 2024). Positions, boundaries and scale are approximate and do not show the current situation — own work, based on the scenario map, LWJ analysis (source 1) and ISW summaries (sources 3, 4)

Supply route threatened (5–13 February): By about 5 February Russian troops were within roughly 1 km of the mouth of the 00542. On the 13th they took a vehicle depot site and cut Industrialnyi Avenue. That night the Zenit garrison was reportedly told to withdraw "on their own".
Junction and Zenit lost (15 February): In the afternoon Russian forces reached the junction of the 00542 and Industrialnyi Avenue, and Zenit fell. Its troops crossed the fields on foot through a corridor reportedly about 120 m wide and had to leave some wounded behind (Ukrainian soldiers' accounts).
Town split (16 February): Russian troops reached the central park and the town was cut in two. ISW put Russian positions in the west and south about 3.5 km apart. The reserve brigade received its withdrawal order that day.
Withdrawal (16–17 February): The commander-in-chief announced the withdrawal shortly before 0100 on the 17th. The reserve brigade was largely out of the coke plant by about 0500, and a mechanised brigade in the south left the 9th Quarter at first light, just before Russian forces took the road to Sieverne. Russia announced control of the town the same day.

Timeline of 13–17 February as date bars: supply route threatened 13–14, junction and Zenit lost 15, town split and corridor held 15–16, withdrawal 16–17. Below: 13th Industrialnyi Avenue cut, 15th afternoon junction reached, 16th ISW 3.5 km assessment, 16th reserve brigade withdrawal order, 17th 0100 withdrawal announced, 17th 0500 coke plant left — Figure 2. Timeline, 13–17 February. Colour shows the nature of the information (blue: Ukrainian statements and actions, red: reported Russian advances, orange: independent ISW assessment) — own work, based on sources 1–5

The withdrawal did not end on 17 February. Ukraine said it pulled back from Lastochkyne on the 26th and from Sieverne and Stepove on the 27th, and that the defence had stabilised on a Tonenke–Orlivka–Berdychi line (Ukrainian statement; Reuters could not verify independently).

Decision Point Analysis

Table of the options considered and the choice made at four decision points. Decision 1: commit the reserve brigade and hold for a limited time; decision 2: small-group infiltration and glide bombs; decision 3: counterattack to reopen the supply road; decision 4: withdrawal in small groups on foot under a rear guard — Figure 3. Options and choices at each decision point. Orange borders mark the option actually taken. Decisions 3 and 4 follow the battalion decisions in the scenario — own work, based on the analysis above and sources 1–5

Decision 1: Hold, and when to leave (Ukrainian higher command, early February–16 February) The options were (a) withdraw as soon as the supply route was threatened, (b) commit the reserve brigade to retake the route and, if that failed within two or three days, organise a withdrawal corridor, or (c) hold to the end. Option (b) was chosen (according to a commander in a neighbouring sector, 16 February). The defence was wearing down Russian combat power, and giving up the town carried a political cost. The route was never reopened, and the withdrawal began only after the junction was lost. LWJ judged that it started once the fall was effectively inevitable. This is the moment in scenario decision 3 where the battalion commander can choose to "recommend withdrawal and prepare in advance".

Decision 2: How to break in (Russian command, October 2023–February 2024) Early mechanised assaults from north and south were costly. Russia then shifted weight to small-group infiltration backed by glide bomb fire: the drainage pipe in the south and the fog-covered approach through the northern garden plots. Choosing conditions that weakened Ukrainian drone surveillance and pushing toward the supply road proved decisive. Russia accepted heavy losses to do it (LWJ; figures cannot be verified).

Decision 3: Enemy at the road mouth (battalion of the reserve brigade, 13 February) This is scenario decision 1. The options were (a) counterattack at once to retake the road, (b) give up the paved road and hold the shoulders of the dirt-track route, (c) reconnoitre before committing, or (d) join the coke plant strongpoint. Public sources indicate the actual task was (a): the brigade went into action on arrival because higher command put reopening the route first. The road was not retaken. The brigade then became one of the covering forces holding the corridor shoulders, and that shaped the outcome of the withdrawal.

Decision 4: How to withdraw under pressure (battalions and brigades, 16–17 February) This covers scenario decisions 4–6. The options were (a) load the remaining vehicles and leave together on one road, (b) leave in small groups on foot at staggered times along several tracks while a rear guard holds the corridor, or (c) hold with everyone until all neighbouring units are out. In practice it was (b). The paved road was already under Russian fire, and vehicle columns made easy targets for glide bombs and drones. Most of the force got out. But jamming and incompatible radios meant some units left before others knew, and some soldiers never received a formal order. Estimates of those captured range from about 100 (Ukrainian officials privately) to 850–1,000 (soldiers' accounts); LWJ considered the lower figure closer to the truth.

Lessons

Retrograde operations: Prepare the withdrawal before deciding on it. With routes, sequence, casualty evacuation and covering forces set in advance, even a late decision can be executed. When covering forces and the rear guard break contact decides the outcome.
Mission command: You can prepare to withdraw while waiting for orders. In the last days, when contact with higher echelons was cut, junior commanders' judgement carried the withdrawal.
Combined arms and communications: Units on different radio systems need liaison officers and agreed times, signals and rally points. On radio alone you cannot tell who is out.
Drones, weather and infiltration: Conditions such as fog that blunt drone surveillance open the door to small-group infiltration. Ground security forces are needed to cover the gap.
Defence in depth: Build the position you will fall back to before you fall back. With no second line, withdrawing units had to dig trenches and lay mines while in contact.

Unresolved Questions

Prisoners and missing: estimates range from about 100 (Ukrainian officials privately, per US officials) to 850–1,000 (soldiers' accounts). Russia claimed about 200 surrendered (24 February).
Timing of the withdrawal decision: when higher command first considered withdrawal has not been made public. The operational-strategic group commander claimed troops fell back to prepared positions and no units were encircled; sources in the reserve brigade spoke of breaking out of an encirclement.
The seven-to-one ratio and about 60 glide bombs a day are brigade claims, not independently verified.

To make the battalion commander's decisions yourself, open the Avdiivka Withdrawal scenario.

Sources

FDD Long War Journal, "Battle of Avdiivka: A Preliminary Analysis" (2024-03-22). https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/03/battle-of-avdiivka-a-preliminary-analysis.php (accessed 2026-10-13)
AP (via PBS NewsHour), report on the withdrawal announcement (2024-02-16). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukraine-to-withdraw-from-avdiivka-where-outnumbered-defenders-held-out-for-4-months (accessed 2026-10-13)
Espreso, summary of ISW's 16 February assessment ("relatively controlled" withdrawal) (2024-02-17). https://global.espreso.tv/military-news-ukrainian-troops-make-relatively-controlled-withdrawal-from-avdiivka-isw (accessed 2026-10-13)
Kyiv Post, summary of ISW's 17 February assessment (encirclement claims, close air support). https://www.kyivpost.com/amp/post/28223 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Kyiv Post, report on the Zenit withdrawal and the reserve brigade (2024-02-16). https://www.kyivpost.com/post/28161 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Euromaidan Press, operational-strategic group commander on the withdrawal (2024-02-17). https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/02/17/commander-ukrainian-troops-withdrew-from-avdiivka (accessed 2026-10-13)
Reuters (via Swissinfo), withdrawal from Sieverne and Stepove and the new line (2024-02-28). https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ukraine-withdraws-from-two-villages-near-avdiivka/73100687 (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikipedia, "Battle of Avdiivka (2023–2024)" (cross-check only). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Avdiivka_(2023%E2%80%932024) (accessed 2026-10-13)
Wikimedia Commons, file page for the Avdiivka coke and chemical plant photo (CC BY-SA 3.0). https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Avdijivskij_Koksochimicheskij_Zavod.JPG (accessed 2026-10-13)